# Performance and Resource Management Sub (Police) Committee 

Date: FRIDAY, 8 FEBRUARY 2013
Time: $\quad 12.30 \mathrm{pm}$
Venue: COMMITTEE ROOMS, 2ND FLOOR, WEST WING, GUILDHALL

Members: Deputy Douglas Barrow (Chairman)
Bob Duffield
Deputy Keith Knowles
Kenneth Ludlam
Don Randall

Enquiries: Iggi Falcon
tel. no.: 02073321405
ignacio.falcon@cityoflondon.gov.uk

Lunch will be served in the Guildhall Club at 1pm

Chris Duffield
Town Clerk and Chief Executive

## AGENDA

## Part 1 - Public Agenda

## 1. APOLOGIES

2. MEMBERS' DECLARATIONS UNDER THE CODE OF CONDUCT IN RESPECT OF ITEMS ON THE AGENDA
3. MINUTES

To agree the public minutes and summary of the meeting held on 14 November 2012.
For Decision
(Pages 1-4)
4. HMIC VALUE FOR MONEY PROFILE 2012

Report of the Commissioner.
For Information
(Pages 5-122)
5. PERFORMANCE AGAINST TARGETS IN THE POLICING PLAN, APRIL TO DECEMBER 2012
Report of the Commissioner.
For Information
(Pages 123-148)
6. POLICING PLAN TARGETS FOR 2013-14

Report of the Commissioner.
For Information
(Pages 149-190)
7. QUESTIONS ON MATTERS RELATING TO THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE
8. ANY OTHER BUSINESS THAT THE CHAIRMAN CONSIDERS URGENT
9. EXCLUSION OF THE PUBLIC

MOTION - That under Section 100(A) of the Local Government Act 1972, the public be excluded from the meeting for the following items on the grounds that they involve the likely disclosure of exempt information as defined in Part I of the Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act.

## Part 2 - Non-Public Agenda

10. NON-PUBLIC MINUTES

To agree the non-public minutes held on 14 November 2012.
11. QUESTIONS ON MATTERS RELATING TO THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE
12. ANY OTHER BUSINESS THAT THE CHAIRMAN CONSIDERS URGENT AND WHICH THE SUB-COMMITTEE AGREE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WHILST THE PUBLIC ARE EXCLUDED

This page is intentionally left blank

## Agenda Item 3

## POLICE PERFORMANCE AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SUB COMMITTEE

14 November 2012

## Minutes of the meeting of the POLICE PERFORMANCE AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SUB COMMITTEE held at Guildhall, EC2 on Wednesday, 14 November 2012 at 11 am.

## Present

## Members

Deputy Doug Barrow (Chairman)
Deputy Keith Knowles
Kenneth Ludlam
Don Randall

## Officers

Neil Davies Head of Corporate Performance and Development
Alex Orme Senior Policy Officer
Ignacio Falcon
Suzanne Jones
Steve Telling
Policy Officer
Business Support Director
Chief Accountant

## City of London Police

lan Dyson
Eric Nisbett
Hayley Williams

Assistant Commissioner
Director of Corporate Services
Secretariat Manager

1. APOLOGIES

Apologies were received from Bob Duffield.
2. DECLARATIONS BY MEMBERS OF ANY PERSONAL AND PREJUDICIAL INTERESTS IN RESPECT OF ITEMS ON THIS AGENDA
There were none.
3. MINUTES

The public minutes and summary of the meeting held on 5 September 2012 were agreed.

Matters Arising
(p.2) Business Continuity Audit Exercise - The Assistant Commissioner confirmed that the next exercise was scheduled to be held on 10 December 2012.
4. PERFORMANCE AGAINST TARGETS FOR THE POLICING PLAN 2012-15 SECOND QUARTER 2012/13

The Sub-Committee considered a report of the Commissioner detailing the Force's performance against the Policing Plan targets for the first and second quarters of $2012 / 13$. Out of 18 targets, three had an 'amber' status.

There was a general discussion about factors that might have impacted on performance until the end of quarter 2, including the London 2012 games. Members also showed interest on the introduction of new shift patterns as part of the City First changes.

Joint CoLP and CoL initiatives to address issues relating to the increase in Night Time Economy were also discussed.

Members proceeded to make specific comments about the targets, as follows:-
Target 11- Victim-based violent crime - The target was expected to be back in 'green' by the end of quarter 3, seeing that the comparable period had experienced high levels in 2011-12.

Target 13 - Road collisions - Members expressed some concern over the Force's capacity to influence performance in this area. The Assistant Commissioner recognised the challenge, although he drew attention to the improving performance in the area (the target had been missed in the past).

RESOLVED - That the report be received and its contents noted.
5. HUMAN RESOURCES MONITORING INFORMATION APRIL 2012 - MARCH 2012
The Sub-Committee considered a report of the Commissioner setting out the Force's Human Resources monitoring data for the period April - September 2012.

There was a general debate about factors which might lead to low levels of staff morale, and whether these related to local (City First, etc.) or national changes (pension, Winsor review, etc.).

On a more specific issue, the Assistant Commissioner explained that the rise of fixed-terms contracts related to some funding streams, particularly in the Economic Crime Directorate, not being guaranteed in the long-term.

RESOLVED - That the report be received and its contents noted.

## 6. QUESTIONS ON MATTERS RELATING TO THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

There were none.
7. ANY OTHER BUSINESS THAT THE CHAIRMAN CONSIDERS URGENT There were none.
8. EXCLUSION OF THE PUBLIC

RESOLVED - That under Section 100A of the Local Government Act 1972, the public be excluded from the meeting for the following items on the grounds that they involved the disclosure of exempt information as defined in Part 1 of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act.
Item No.

## Exempt Paragraphs

9-11
4

## ITEMS CONSIDERED WHILST THE PUBLIC WERE EXCLUDED

9. NON-PUBLIC MINUTES

The non-public minutes of the meeting held on 5 September were agreed.
10. BUDGETED WORKFORCE

The Sub-Committee received a report of the Commissioner.
11. CITY FIRST CHANGE PROGRAMME

The Sub-Committee received a report of the Commissioner.
12. QUESTIONS ON MATTERS RELATING TO THE WORK OF THE
COMMITTEE

There were none.
13. ANY OTHER BUSINESS THAT THE CHAIRMAN CONSIDERS URGENT AND WHICH THE COMMITTEE AGREE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WHILST THE PUBLIC ARE EXCLUDED
There were none.

The meeting closed at 12 noon

CHAIRMAN

Contact Officer: Iggi Falcon
tel. no. 02073321405
e-mail: ignacio.falcon@cityoflondon.gov.uk

This page is intentionally left blank

Page 4

## Agenda Item 4

| Committee(s): <br> Performance and Resource Management <br> Sub Committee | Date(s): <br> $8^{\text {th }}$ February 2013 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Subject: <br> City of London Police - <br> HMIC Value for Money Profile 2012 |  |
| Report of: <br> Commissioner of Police <br> POL | Public |

## Summary

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) produces Value for Money (VFM) profiles for all police forces as a means of comparing budgets and spending with each other (Appendix A). The majority of forces fall into defined clusters using most similar groupings. The City of London, by its very nature does not have a most similar comparator and as such shows as an "outlier" in a number of areas (definition of an 'outlier' is if the force is shown in top or bottom 10 percent and the effect is greater than $£ 1$ per head of population).

This report is accompanied by a detailed breakdown (Appendix B) of areas where the City of London Police are identified as outliers, which include areas including ;overall expenditure; cost per officer; Non- Staff costs; workforce FTEs; workforce and crime trends and a number of other areas identified by the City of London Corporation Chamberlain's Department who were consulted in the preparation of this analysis, as being of interest. Where similar areas have been looked at in previous VFM reports the ranking has been included to identify any extremes in direction of travel.

A brief rationale is provided on each of the areas in order to clarify why the Force is shown as an outlier. Where applicable an indication of the future costs, as projected by the City First Change Programme, has been included.

The common themes that have been identified as positioning the City of London Police as an outlier in a number of the areas include :

- Not accounting for the higher cost of staff salaries and services in London.
- The Force does not benefit from the economies of scale enjoyed by larger Forces.
- There is a requirement for the Force as a Home Office force, to perform the same functions and roles as that of larger forces, to provide a policing service to the City Community.

From the main findings from the VFM profiles there are no unexpected findings when the points above are considered.

## Recommendations

It is recommended that this report be received and its contents noted.

## Main Report

## Background

1. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) produces Value for Money profiles for all police forces as a means of comparing budgets and spending between forces (Appendix A). The majority of forces fall into defined clusters using most similar groupings. The City of London Police force, by its very nature does not have a most similar comparator and as such is an'outlier' in a number of areas (definition of an outlier is if it is in the top or bottom 10 percent and the effect is greater than $£ 1$ per head of population). An important factor not accounted for in the profiles is the higher cost of staff and services in London. The Force has been identified as an outlier in a number of areas including ;overall expenditure; cost per officer; Non- Staff costs; workforce FTEs; workforce and crime trends.
2. Where applicable, the 'per thousand population' calculations are based on a 'notional' combined working and resident population of 308,000 (2011 figure 316,500 ). This however, does not take account of the City's large visitor and transient population numbers.

## Current Position

3. This report provides a breakdown in table form of areas where the City of London Police are identified as an outlier and also other areas identified by the City of London Corporation Chamberlains Department, who were consulted in the preparation of this analysis, as being of interest. Directorate/Department heads have provided a brief rationale on their respective areas in order to clarify why the Force is shown as an outlier.

## City First

4. Where possible an indication of the future costs as projected by the City First Change Programme has been included. City First's objective is to deliver a policing model that allows the City of London Police to meet its objectives within a budget that is being reduced by about 20 per cent over the next four years, as a result of the Government's Comprehensive Spending Review.
5. This has involved carrying out a comprehensive review of the force's operations and design; every aspect is being reviewed and assessed to make sure that it is efficient, necessary, offers value for money and supports the force's policing priorities. The City First Change Programme has considered ways the Force can increase its income or reduce its costs and if there are opportunities to achieve greater efficiency or reduce costs by working in partnership with other organisations to deliver services these will be explored.
6. At the conclusion of the City First Change Programme, a programme of continuous improvement through business as usual, will be embedded to ensure that processes and procedures are assessed and that services are being delivered in the most effective and efficient way. This will allow us to constantly evaluate the demand on the service from the threats, harm and risks facing the force, and shape services around this. It will therefore enable the Force to focus on where it can reduce costs whilst seeking to maintain high performance.

## Conclusion

7. The Value for Money profile 2012 does not throw up any surprises due to the unique nature of our location and remit. The high cost of services and salaries allied to a small per head of population figure will always position the Force as an outlier in comparison with regional forces. The programme of work that will carry on after the City First change programme will continue to explore and drive efficiency in all areas of our services. With an ever increasing demand on our services in a tight financial environment, efficiency and value for money are fundamental to the decision making processes of the City of London Police particularly where it relates to service provision, and this will continue to be the case.

## Recommendations

8. It is recommended that this report and appendices are received and the contents noted.

## Appendices

HMIC Value for Money Profile 2012
HMIC Value for Money Profile 2012 Analysis report

Contact:<br>Chief Inspector Tony Cairney<br>02076012098

Tony.cairney@cityoflondon.police.uk

HMIC Value for Money Profiles 2012
City of London Police
compared with all forces in England and Wales
The forces in the most similar group can be identified
in the charts in this section by using the key below
City of London
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section One - Workforce and Costs
Introduction

$\begin{array}{ll}16 & \text { Earned Income } \\ 17 & \text { Funding Source }\end{array}$
 Section Two - Offences \& Outcomes Introduction
$\begin{array}{ll}65 & \text { Sexual offences } \\ 67 & \text { Stealing } \\ 69 & \text { Non Victim Based }\end{array}$
$\begin{array}{ll}74 & \text { Sexual offences } \\ 75 & \text { Stealing } \\ 76 & \text { Non Victim Based }\end{array}$
80 Charges
82 Overall Satisfaction
Appendices
92 Forces who return data on restorative justice, or outsource custody

## How to use the profiles

The purpose of the profiles is to help you compare your force with others. Most of the data is presented as bar charts so you can see the range of forces and where your force sits. A horizontal line runs across each bar chart and represents the simple average.
Your force is highlighted in black, but you will also notice some other forces highlighted in a darker blue. This group of forces are considered to be most similar to your force, sharing similar demographic characteristics. For this reason they make for a better comparison than with other forces. They are generally referred to as the MSG or the most similar group.

[^0]The MSG was designed to more fairly compare levels of crime between forces, rather than costs. They do not take account of the fact that some areas, such as London, have higher costs than elsewhere. However, they are still useful as a cost comparison as forces in a high crime MSG such as that for large urban forces are likely to have more resources, such as more police officers per head of population.

[^1]The small blue tables on most pages include key numerical data presented in the charts. Often they include a more detailed list of functions and costs. Reading from left to right, the tables include: a short description of the function (or crime type), followed by the volumes (e.g. Staff numbers / costs or numbers of crimes); the ratio for comparison such as your force's cost per head of population and the average costs per head of population (either the "all" England and Wales average or the "Group" MSG average).
To the right of the main table, we show how much more or less it is costing your force as a result of costs being higher or lower than the average. The more detailed financial pages include a further table. This shows whether your force spends disproportionately more than the average on police officers. Taking the call centre function for example, you might question why some forces have disproportionately higher police officer costs compared with the average.
You will notice the appearance of chevrons against some cost of difference calculations. These figures are highlighted if the indicator puts the force in the top or bottom ten percent and the effect of the difference is greater than $£ 1$ per head of population.
GUIDANCE PAGE - How to read a profile POLICE OFFICERS
2012/13 estimates $£$ per head of population
These charts break down police officer costs into salary and overtime costs (OT). Police officer overtime costs are also shown as a percentage of the overall salary costs.

1. Logic trees breakdown left to $\quad \begin{aligned} & \text { are also presented. } \\ & \text { Home Office published FTE }\end{aligned}$ right, comparing force (a) to most $n$ at 31st March 2012, and so similar group (highlighted) as well as all forces in England and Wales.


|  | £m | £/head | Avg |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Police officers (exc. OT) | 376.6 | 143.2 | 105.5 |
| Police overtime | 15.1 | 5.8 | 3.5 |
| Total | 391.8 | 149.0 | 108.9 |
|  |  |  |  |
| PO overtime \% salary |  | \% sal | Avg |
| National functions | $0.4 \%$ | $0.1 \%$ |  |
| Other |  | $3.6 \%$ | $3.1 \%$ |
| Total |  | $4.0 \%$ | $3.3 \%$ |

Total $4.0 \% \quad 3.3 \%$

Page 13

## Data quality

HMIC gives every force the opportunity to check their Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) financial estimates data and Home Office management data (excluding crime data which is checked by the Home Office) through a systematic quality assurance process:

- CIPFA apply arithmetic and reconciliation checks
- Each force is asked to check their statistical outliers
- Each force receives a draft profile to check again
- HMIC resolves inconsistencies identified by ourselves and forces
Each year forces identify some anomalies or inconsistencies, which HMIC try hard to resolve. HMIC strongly encourage forces to make the necessary changes, but forces are responsible for the data they have submitted. As a result some anomalies may remain.
There are a number of ways to identify them. First, where significantly higher than average costs in one function are also shown against lower than average costs in another related function. One example is extremely high HR costs compared with extremely low training costs. Second, where costs are surprisingly
low or high. Lastly, some urban forces are reporting comparatively low rates of criminal damage and anti social behaviour incidents. This probably reflects differences in the ability of IT systems to capture all the data.


## Validity of comparisons

Collaboration and contracting out A few forces have raised concerns about the validity of staff comparisons between forces involved in collaborations
badly in their comparisons and distort the MSG averages. Others suggest that the comparison of non staff costs, when some forces are contracting out large parts of their organisation, is less than useful.

[^2]
## New data sets

 mostly used to $p$between forces.
Although the profiles show the budgeted POA and ADR 502 ftes side by side, there is no expectation that they be the same for two main reasons. First, the
POA staff numbers are an average over the following financial year (2012-13), while the ADR is a snapshot at the end of the previous year (March 31 st
2012). Second, the POA counts budgeted staff and will therefore include vacant posts, while the ADR counts the actual staff in post. You may notice a
large difference between the two data for police staff numbers. This may be due to reductions in staff numbers between the end of one financial year and
the start of the next.
Restorative justice For a force to submit a count of Restorative justice (RJ) to the Home Office, the only requirement is for the force to have a local policy in place. As there is no definition that would allow comparison, RJs are unlikely to be a National Statistic and are not included in the profiles.

> Emergency and priority incidents per population The data shows how the demands on your force for the two highest priority calls differ from your most similar forces and others. Total emergency and priority incidents ${ }^{i}$ are broken down into those related to crime, anti social behaviour (ASB) and other incidents. This data is drawn from force command and control systems and therefore will not include all recorded crimes or incidents.

> A striking feature of other EP incidents is that the average exceeds that for the averages of crime and ASB. Further research by HMIC at six forces ii has revealed that a handful of categories included in 'other incidents' account for around 50 percent of the total. These invariably include: concerns for welfare (which can include individuals with mental health problems and other vulnerable people, such as the elderly or children), domestic incidents, suspicious circumstances, traffic collisions and ASB classified as nuisance.

## Lower priorities, scheduled calls, have not been

 recorded on command and control systems; often they are recorded on separate systems for appointments.${ }^{\text {ii }}$ The emergency and priority (EP) incident classifications are based on ACPO/NPIA definitions to make the data more comparable (see "National Contact Management Principles and Guidance", ACPO and NPIA, London, 2010). Emergency incidents are defined as aiming to get to victim within 15 mins or 20 mins in rural locations. Priority incidents are generally those with an estimated time of arrival of within 60 mins. Some forces do not distinguish between these categories, so they are combined in the charts.
As this data is new we have encountered some minor problems, which we would like to draw to your attention. While some further local checking may required, we feel the information remains useful for comparative purposes - especially where there are large differences. You may like to check two control system as a means of making sure that an urgent task is carried out by others. Admin incidents represent a small proportion, often less than 5 percent. Second, we know of some forces which provided incidents with duplicate incidents included. The percentages are again small, these forces are as follows: Avon and Somerset, Dyfed Powys, Metropolitan Police, Norfolk, North Yorkshire and South Yorkshire.
Lower priority, scheduled calls have not been used as these data were found to be unreliable. The main reason is that scheduled calls are not always recorded on command and control systems, often they are recorded on separate systems for appointments.
Ribbon charts showing longer term trends, 2001-02 to 2011-12, for some crimes by force. Four types of crime rates are shown because of their distinctive patterns: violence with injury, vehicle theft (including interference), burglaries (all) and criminal damage.
The purpose of these charts is to examine the trends for your force compared with similar forces set against the rest. If your recent trends differ from the similar forces, and the general pattern, then you should review the likely causes and locations.
A few observations on the main four charts. A general feature is the reduction in the range of crime rates between forces over the period. This suggests that forces are becoming more similar in some respects, although part of this convergence is likely due to changes in recording. For example, the violence with injury chart shows large variations in crime recording, certainly until 2005-06 when the National Crime Recording Standards (NCRS) were being implemented. (2008-09 is the baseline year used in the profiles). It also shows that the introduction of NCRS had little impact on one force.
No crime rates - we show four year trends and a comparison with the all force average. The highest no crime rate is for rape.
Council tax yield - this chart shows the variation in the yield per head for your force compared with others for $£ 1$ change in Council tax.
Common queries

## A final word..

Almost without exception forces have made changes to their data. Like last year, several have also raised detailed points and we would especially like to thank those who have taken the trouble to give us feedback. We count within this group two regular contributors: Thames Valley Police and Lancashire, but this year add North Wales, South Wales, Northamptonshire and Northumbria Police as each made important points.
I am always keen to hear from users how the profiles can be improved. If you have any suggestions, or any analysis which you think might be useful to
include please contact me: lawrenceroy.morris33@hmic.gsi.gov.uk or 02035130517.
This section looks at both how a force deploys its workforce and the associated costs of each of the 12 headline categories within the Police Objective Analysis (POA). POA subcategory information on costs is also presented.
POA 2012/13 estimates are used for all cost and workforce data unless stated otherwise. These data are taken as a snapshot as at 9th October. Any updates to the data which are made after this time will not be reflected in the profile.
Workforce data comprises full-time equivalent (FTE) figures. In POA estimates these are calculated as the number of staff budgeted for each staff type. Within support services, staff levels are less likely to be affected by local demographics and are therefore additonally presented as cost of function as a percentage of total cost.
Local policing workforce by function
The POA data is initially divided into twelve groups:
Local policing
Dealing with the public
Roads policing
Specialist operations
Intelligence
Investigations
Investigative support
Criminal ju
Support functions
Police authority
National policing
Throughout the profiles the chart scales differ and the differences shown may not be as significant as they first appear.

## INTRODUCTION

Key to the data and calculations
Net revenue expenditure: The profiles use a different calculation for net revenue expenditure to Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA); it is calculated as total expenditure minus earned income to show the total cost of policing to the taxpayer.
Earned income: Where earned income is referred to, this covers partnership income, sales fees charges and rents, special police services, reimbursed income and interest.
Averages: All averages in this section (unless otherwise stated) are simple, unweighted England and Wales averages, which include the force in question. As the Metropolitan Police and City of London Police data distorts the chart scales, they have been excluded from all force profiles except for their own
Difference to most similar group (MSG) / All force: Differences are calculated on standardised data, as opposed to absolute values.
Calculation is as follows: (Force cost per head - MSG cost per head) * population.
Police officer as \% of gross expenditure: We have chosen to show the proportion of spend on officer (and overtime) by function.
Calculation is as follows: (Police officer spend + Police officer overtime) / Gross Revenue Expenditure (GRE).
Users may wish to focus on those charts where the force is an outlier, i.e. where they are significantly different from the average, or where they are particularly high or low. Outliers are highlighted with red chevrons and fall within the top or bottom $10 \%$ of forces; where applicable with a financial value of more than $£ 1$ per head. They should explore the reasons for any differences by looking at the force as a whole, using relevant local knowledge. Staffing levels should also be considered in the context of workforce modernisation, collaboration efforts and the outsourcing of services.
2012/13 estimates $£$ per head of population

[^3]





## POLICE OFFICERS

2012/13 estimates $£$ per head of population



NON-STAFF COSTS AS PERCENTAGE OF WORKFORCE COSTS 2012/13 estimates

| $6 \%$ |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| $5 \%$ |  |
| $4 \%$ |  |
| $3 \%$ |  |
| $2 \%$ |  |
| $2 \%$ |  |
| $1 \%$ |  |
| $0 \%$ | Transport related expenses |
|  |  |


Page 22
FINANCING OF EXPENDITURE
2012/13 estimates $£$ per head of population

| £250 | Formula funding |
| :---: | :---: |
| £200 - |  |
| £150 |  |
| £100 |  |
| £50 |  |
| £0 |  |




| Council Tax $£ /$ head | Yield of $£ 1$ CT | Avg |
| :---: | :---: | ---: |
| $£ 0$ | na | $£ 0.36$ |

Page 23
EARNED INCOME
2012/13 estimates $£$ per head of population


Page 24
FUNDING SOURCE TRENDS
2009/10-2010/11 actuals and estimates for 2011/12-2012/13 $£$ per head of population
These charts show how the financial position and funding of forces
has changed since 2009/10.
Please note that estimates of reserves are unreliable, and that
these figures are not adjusted for inflation.

| $£ 350$ |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 300$ |  |  |
| $£ 250$ |  |  |
| $£ 200$ |  |  |
| $£ 150$ |  |  |
| $£ 100$ |  |  |
| $£ 50$ |  |  |
| $£ 0$ |  |  |
| $2009 / 10$ | $2010 / 11$ |  |


| £ per 1000 | $2009 / 10$ | $2010 / 11$ | $2011 / 12$ | $2012 / 13$ | Change |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Central gov funding | 285.4 | 273.9 | 292.2 | 286.4 | $0 \%$ |
| Reserves | -21.1 | -1.0 | 10.6 | 7.0 |  |
| Council tax | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | na |
| Total funding | 264.3 | 272.8 | 302.8 | 293.5 | $11 \%$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Average | $2009 / 10$ | $2010 / 11$ | $2011 / 12$ | $2012 / 13$ | Change |
| Central gov funding | 145.8 | 148.9 | 141.6 | 134.2 | $-8 \%$ |
| Reserves | -0.1 | -3.6 | 1.5 | 1.4 |  |
| Council tax | 54.3 | 55.9 | 56.2 | 58.2 | $7 \%$ |
| Total funding | 200.1 | 201.2 | 199.3 | 193.8 | $-3 \%$ |

[^4]WORKFORCE - SUMMARY
March 2012

[^5]
Population 308 k

| \% Total | Avg |
| ---: | ---: |
| $26 \%$ | $31 \%$ |
| $3 \%$ | $7 \%$ |
| $29 \%$ | $38 \%$ |
|  |  |
| $44 \%$ | $29 \%$ |
| $28 \%$ | $33 \%$ |
| $100 \%$ | $100 \%$ |




| Special constables | 99 | 0.32 | 0.32 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Contractors | 78 | 0.25 | 0.03 |
| Source: ADR 502 / 601 March 2012 |  |  |  |



March 2012 \% of FTE

[^6]




WORKFORCE \& CRIME TRENDS
These charts compare trends of all officers
These charts compare trends of all officers and total crime excluding fraud and forgery.
Charges data also exclude fraud and forgery.
We have opted to show totals in order to maintain both consistency and better data quality
over time.
Note: PCSO are not shown.
These charts should be used to highlight relative changes rather than absolutes values.




|  | $\mathbf{2 0 0 5 / 0 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 6 / 0 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 7 / 0 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 8 / 0 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 9 / 1 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 0 / 1 1}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 1 / 1 2}$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Police officers | 875 | 861 | 830 | 813 | 852 | 878 | 831 |
| Police staff | 314 | 319 | 299 | 297 | 310 | 337 | 331 |
| All crime ex F\&F | 7,951 | 7,649 | 7,186 | 6,855 | 6,215 | 5,997 | 5,933 |
| Charges ex F\&F | 1,438 | 1,245 | 1,264 | 1,369 | 1,045 | 1,222 | 1,216 | | Crimes/officer | 9 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| National Avg | 39 | 39 | 36 | 34 | 31 | 30 | 30 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Charges/officer | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.5 |
| National Avg | 5.5 | 5.2 | 5.1 | 5.1 | 5.0 | 5.1 | 5.2 |


| \% crime victim-based |  |  |  | $76.5 \%$ | $76.3 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

National Avg

Source: ADR 502 March 2012 and Home Office Crime 08/09
COMMUNITY POLICE OFFICERS AND CRIME March 2012 workforce, 2011/12 crime

Force breakdown against group average - staff POA 12/13 ESTIMATES
Population 308 k

|  | Budgeted staff FTE |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | PO | PS | Total |
| Neighbourhood | 70 | 52 | 122 |
| Incident response | 136 | 0 | 136 |
| Local investigation | 58 | 0 | 58 |
| Other | 15 | 3 | 18 |
| Local policing | 279 | 55 | 334 |
| Dealing with the public | 26 | 46 | 72 |
| Road policing | 41 | 2 | 43 |
| Specialist operations | 133 | 4 | 137 |
| Intelligence | 40 | 25 | 65 |
| Investigations | 139 | 9 | 148 |
| Investigative support | 11 | 12 | 23 |
| Custody | 18 | 10 | 28 |
| Other | 12 | 45 | 57 |
| Criminal justice | 30 | 55 | 85 |
| ICT | 0 | 28 | 28 |
| Human resources | 3 | 24 | 27 |
| Training | 28 | 14 | 42 |
| Other | 27 | 122 | 149 |
| Support functions | 58 | 188 | 246 |
| Police authority | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Central costs | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total exc national | 757 | 396 | 1,153 |
| National policing | 129 | 73 | 202 |
| Total | 886 | 469 | 1,354 |

Source: POA estimates 2012/13
Note that workforce under the heading of 'local investigation' are included within 'local policing' not 'investigation'
Force breakdown against group average - cost POA 12/13 ESTIMATES
Population 308 k

| Diff from group £m | \% of total |  | \% PO * |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Force | Group | Force | Group |
| 0.0 | 6\% | 6\% | 64\% | 64\% |
| 0.0 | 10\% | 10\% | 100\% | 100\% |
| 0.0 | 3\% | 3\% | 100\% | 100\% |
| 0.0 | 2\% | 2\% | 73\% | 73\% |
| 0.0 | 21\% | 21\% | 87\% | 84\% |
| 0.0 | 5\% | 5\% | 45\% | 45\% |
| 0.0 | 2\% | 2\% | 95\% | 95\% |
| 0.0 | 10\% | 10\% | 93\% | 93\% |
| 0.0 | 4\% | 4\% | 68\% | 68\% |
| 0.0 | 12\% | 12\% | 88\% | 77\% |
| 0.0 | $2 \%$ | 2\% | 48\% | 48\% |
| 0.0 | 2\% | 2\% | 51\% | 51\% |
| 0.0 | 3\% | 3\% | 25\% | 25\% |
| 0.0 | 5\% | 5\% | 36\% | 36\% |
| 0.0 | 6\% | 6\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| 0.0 | 2\% | 2\% | 13\% | 13\% |
| 0.0 | 2\% | 2\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| 0.0 | 16\% | 16\% | 13\% | 13\% |
| 0.0 | 26\% | 26\% | 10\% | 10\% |
| 0.0 | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| 0.0 | 12\% | 12\% | 0\% | 0\% |
| 0.0 | 100\% | 100\% | 51\% | 51\% |


|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 10 \\ & 10 \\ & 10 \\ & 10 \\ & 10 \\ & 10 \end{aligned}$ |  |  | $\stackrel{\square}{\circ}$ $\stackrel{\star}{\sim}$ | $\begin{gathered} \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\mathrm{N}} \\ \underset{\sim}{2} \\ \underset{\sim}{\mathrm{~N}} \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & m \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \Gamma \stackrel{0}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{\circ}{0} \\ & \stackrel{0}{m} \end{aligned}$ | $\infty$ $\sim$ $\sim$ $\sim$ $\sim$ $\sim$ $\sim$ $\sim$ $\sim$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |



| $8 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $6 \%$ |
| $4 \%$ |
| $2 \%-$ |
| $2 \%$ |



|  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |


|  | Strength* | Joiners | $\%$ | Avg |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Police officers | 878 | 0 | $0.0 \%$ | $0.9 \%$ |
| PCSO | 44 | 0 | $0.0 \%$ | $6.1 \%$ |
| Police staff | 337 | 25 | $7.4 \%$ | $3.6 \%$ |
| Overall | 1,259 | 25 | $2.0 \%$ | $2.2 \%$ |
| * as at Mar 11 <br> Source: $A D R 521 ~ \& ~ A D R ~ 502 ~(a s ~ a t ~ 31 / 03 / 12 ~ a n d ~ 30 / 09 / 2011) ~$ |  |  |  |  |


These charts show the percentage of the workforce that joined the force in 2011/12, against a baseline of 2010/11.

## 

[^7]




[^8]

Page 34
POLICE OFFICERS LENGTH OF SERVICE










LOCAL POLICING including local investigation/ prisoner processing
Objectives - cost per head of population







Page 38






DEALING WITH THE PUBLIC



page 32


|  | Averages |  |  |  | Diff FTE |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Staffing | FTE | FTE/1000 | All | MSG | All | MSG |
| Police officers | 26 | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.08 | 12 | 0 |
| Police Staff | 46 | 0.15 | 0.26 | 0.15 | -35 | 0 |
| Expenditure | £m | £/head | All | MSG | All | MSG |
| Police officers | 1.7 | 5.5 | 2.6 | 5.5 | 0.9 | 0.0 |
| Police staff +PCSO | 1.9 | 6.3 | 8.4 | 6.3 | -0.6 | 0.0 |
| Non-staff costs | 0.2 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Income | 0.0 | -0.1 | -0.1 | -0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Total cost | 3.8 | 12.3 | 11.5 | 12.3 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| Cost/fte |  |  | All | MSG | All | MSG |
| Police officers |  | £65k | £55k | £65k | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| Police Staff |  | £42k | £31k | £42k | 0.5 | 0.0 |

CCU + Front Desk




Central communications unit only


| FTE staff <br> Gross cost | 50 <br> $£ 3.0 \mathrm{~m}$ |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
|  |  |  |
|  |  | Avg |
| FTE/1000 pop | 0.16 | 0.16 |
| Calls per FTE | na | 0 |
| Calls per 1000 | na | 0 |
| Cost per call | na | $£ 0$ |
| Source: POA data |  |  |

EMERGENCY \& PRIORITY (EP) CALLS PER POPULATION
2011-12
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
-2
$a$



[^9]

Page 44
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ARRANGEMENTS

| Diff FTE |  |
| :---: | ---: |
| All | MSG |
| 9 |  |
| -12 | 0 |
| Diff $£ m$ |  |
| All |  |
| 0.4 | MSG |
| 0.3 | 0.0 |
| -0.4 | 0.0 |
| -0.4 | 0.0 |
| 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Diff $£ m$ |  |
| All |  |
| -0.1 | MSG |
| 0.6 | 0.0 |



page 37

Page 45
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Staffing and cost compared to charges





[^10]page 38
SPECIALIST OPERATIONS






| \% PO | MSG |
| ---: | ---: |
| $96 \%$ | $96 \%$ |
| $99 \%$ | $99 \%$ |
| $98 \%$ | $98 \%$ |
| na | $0 \%$ |
| $81 \%$ | $81 \%$ |
| na | $0 \%$ |
| $69 \%$ | $69 \%$ |
| na | $0 \%$ |
| $96 \%$ | $96 \%$ |
| $93 \%$ | $93 \%$ |


Objectives - cost per head of population
308k


HMIC Source: POA estimates 2012/13

Page 47
SPECIALIST OPERATIONS
Use of resources




Averages

$$
\begin{array}{|l|l|}
\hline \text { FTE } & \text { FTE/1000 } \\
\hline
\end{array}
$$

$$
\left[\begin{array}{ll}
⿳ ⺈ ⿴ 囗 十 一 & \infty \\
0 & 0 \\
0 \\
0 & \hat{0} \\
0 & 0 \\
0
\end{array}\right]
$$

|  |  | $\stackrel{\stackrel{+}{+}}{\stackrel{+}{r}}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\stackrel{9}{\sim} \underset{\sim}{\sim}$ | $\stackrel{\stackrel{+}{\square}}{\stackrel{-}{\square}}$ |
| $\stackrel{E}{4}$ | $\underset{\sim}{\mathrm{N}} \mathrm{O}$ | $\stackrel{\bigcirc}{\circ}$ |
|  |  | 范 |

[^11]INVESTIGATIONS exc local investigation/prisoner processing



Diff

| \% PO | MSG |
| ---: | ---: |
| $93 \%$ | $93 \%$ |
| $94 \%$ | $94 \%$ |
| $100 \%$ | $100 \%$ |
| $84 \%$ | $84 \%$ |
| $95 \%$ | $95 \%$ |
| $79 \%$ | $79 \%$ |
| $88 \%$ | $77 \%$ |


page 43



INVESTIGATIONS

INVESTIGATIVE SUPPORT
Objectives - cost per head of population














a


Population 308
səळeлә^ $\forall$

| Total $\begin{array}{lllll}21.1 & 68.3 & 39.0 & 68.3 & 9.0 \\ \text { Source: POA estimates } 2012 / 13\end{array}$ |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- |


| Performance review | 1.7 | 5.4 | 2.5 | 5.4 | 0.9 | 0.0 | $\ll$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :--- |
| Professional standards | 0.8 | 2.7 | 1.4 | 2.7 | 0.4 | 0.0 | $\ll$ |
| All other | 0.8 | 2.5 | 4.2 | 2.5 | -0.5 | 0.0 | $\ll$ |
| Total | 21.1 | 68.3 | 39.0 | 68.3 | 9.0 | 0.0 | $\lll$ |

[^12]









 |  | Averages |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Staffing | FTE | FTE/1000 | All | MSG |
| Police officers | 129 | 0.42 | 0.07 | 0.42 |
| PCSOs | - | - | 0.00 | - |
| Police staff | 73 | 0.24 | 0.03 | 0.24 |



| Specific grants | 14.6 | 47.4 | 4.0 | 47.4 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Cost net of grants | -3.9 | -12.8 | 0.5 | -12.8 |

WORKFORCE MIX
The table below uses POA data to look at differences in the proportion of workforce that are police staff and PCSOs, compared to the proportion that are officers. For each POA category the percentage of workforce who are staff and PCSOs in your force are compared to levels in other forces.

1) Comparing your force to the median percentage (i.e. 'middle' ratio of staff to officers where 21 forces report a high \%staff and or PCSO and 21 forces report a lower \%). 2) Comparing your force to the upper quartile (the percentage above which only a quarter of forces report higher staff and or PCSO).
Each time, the number of posts this change represents to your force is calculated, along with the cost of this difference (based on the number of posts and the difference between the median cost per office and median cost per police staff/PCSO). These average costs include overtime but exclude agency staff and are calculated separately for each of the chosen
Please note, the cost of difference is indicative and not a 'saving' opportunity as it is unlikely that the full differences could be realised in any given case.
The analysis does not include specials or look at the 'Local Policing' POA category (where most specials are counted and where a different analytical approach would be required).
Note: If total staff numbers per population in a particular category are less than a quarter of the national median for that category then the relevant rows in the table are left blank.
This is because such low numbers either indicate a problem with the data or that the relevant function may be contracted out (and hence the calculations are not applicable).


Difference
from UQ
(no. of
posts)


|  |  <br>  | ® |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |


|  | Current staffing |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Police <br> officers | Staff <br> IPCSO | \%Staff/ |
|  | na | na | na |
| Criminal Justice | na | na | na |
| Central Communications Unit | na | na | na |
| Intelligence Analysis | na | na | na |
| Administration Support | na | na | na |
| Local Call Centres / Front Desk | na | na | na |
| Training | na | na | na |
| Intelligence Gathering | na | na |  |
| Custody | na | na | na |
| Contact Management Units | na | na | na |
| Human Resources | na | na | na |
| Other Forensic Services | na | na | na |
| Scenes of Crime Officers | na | na |  |
| Grand Total |  |  |  |
| Source: POA estimates 2012/13 |  |  |  |

Difference

|  | Difference |
| :---: | :---: |
| National | from median | | Cost of |
| :---: |
| median \% | (no. of posts) | difference |
| :---: |


The analysis focuses on thirteen POA categories where our analysis found significant costs of difference between forces.
Section Two - Offences \& Outcomes
This section focuses on criminal offences dealt with by each force and resulting outcomes. Crime and sanction detections are presented in the format developed
by HMIC in consultation with stakeholders as displayed below.
The intention is to differentiate between crimes that are victim based, and those that are driven by police activity.
The intention is to differentiate between crimes that are victim based, and those that are driven by police activity.


Page 61
Data is shown as offences per 1,000 population.
Definitions of offences in each category can be found in Appendix 1.
Note that fraud and forgery are generally excluded from all crime as we recognise that the recording in this area is not as robust as other crime categories.
A sanction detection means that a recorded crime has been resolved by the police. The types of outcomes are:
> Caution - police have identified a suspect and issued them with a caution
> Penalty notice for disorder - a fine issued by the police for anti-social behaviour, as well as shoplifting, criminal damage and possession of cannabis
$>$ Charge
> Cannabis warning
We acknowledge that 24 forces are returning data on community resolutions / restorative justice, and that these will affect sanction detection rates. These forces are listed in Appendix 3.
Expected sanction detection volumes are calculated by modelling what force detections would be should the force align to the peer average.
MSG averages are generally used in this section. The averages quoted are simple unweighted averages and not weighted national averages.
Changes over time for crimes and sanction detections are measured against the baseline of 2008/09 due to the introduction of public order offences.

| S」ə૫IO |
| :---: |
| dnodo |
| əכภ」 |

Note range $=$ max $-\min$ rate
between the start and end of the period.
The first three charts show interesting longer term trends across all forces, notably a reduction in variance
between the start and end of the period.

## $\bullet$

\bullet
\bullet
$\stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{*}$

Violence with injury

Range Group
All forces

Page 63
Force
Group
Others


Note range $=\max -\min$ rate









| Fraud \& forgery | 186 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |


| Grand total | 6,119 | 19.9 | 19.9 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

Source: Home Office Crime Statistics 2011/12

|  | Offences | per 1000 | MSG | Difference |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: | ---: |
| Victim based | 4,851 | 15.7 | 15.7 |  |  |
| Non victim based | 1,082 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 0 | $0 \%$ |
| Total exc fraud | 5,933 | 19.3 | 19.3 | 0 | $0 \%$ |
|  |  | 0 | $0 \%$ |  |  |

Fraud forger 186
Source: Home Office Crime Statistics 2011/12

Population 308 k
SANCTION DETECTIONS - ALL CRIMES
SANCTION DETECTIONS - ALL CRIMES
The actual \% expected figures shows your detection rate as a
percentage of the national average detection rate. Hence if
above $100 \%$, you are achieving more sanction detections than the
national average.
As at March 2012,23 forces submitted data on community
resolutions / restorative justice - this will negatively affect sanction
detection rates.
Forces reporting these data are listed in Appendix 3.


RECORDED OFFENCES - VICTIM BASED
2011/12 per 1,000 population







|  | Offences | per 1000 | MSG |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Violence against the person | 534 | 1.7 | 1.7 |
| Sexual offences | 35 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Stealing | 4,051 | 13.1 | 13.1 |
| Criminal damage \& arson | 231 | 0.7 | 0.7 |
| Victim based offences | 4,851 | 15.7 | 15.7 |
| Sourc: |  |  |  |

SANCTION DETECTIONS - VICTIM BASED



RECORDED OfFENCES - VIOLENCE AGAINST THE PERSON 2011/12 per 1,000 population


> | Difference |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| 0 | $0 \%$ |
| 0 | $0 \%$ |
| 0 | $0 \%$ |

|  | Offences | per 1000 | MSG |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| With injury | 260 | 0.8 | 0.8 |
| Without injury | 274 | 0.9 | 0.9 |
| Violence against person |  |  |  |
| Source: Home Office Crime Statistics $2011 / 12$ |  |  |  |

SANCTION DETECTIONS - VIOLENCE AGAINST THE PERSON




|  | Offences | SDs | \% | Msg | Exp | Diff |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rape | 2 | 2 | 100\% | 100\% | 2 | 0 |
| Other sexual offences | 33 | 8 | 24\% | 24\% | 8 | 0 |
| Sexual offences | 35 | 10 | 29\% | 29\% | 10 | 0 |

RECORDED OFFENCES - STEALING
2011/12 per 1,000 population


| Difference |  |
| :---: | :---: |
|  |  |
| 0 | $0 \%$ |
| 0 | $0 \%$ |
| 0 | $0 \%$ |
| 0 | $0 \%$ |
| 0 | $0 \%$ |
| 0 | $0 \%$ |
|  |  |
| 0 | $0 \%$ |
| 0 | $0 \%$ |
| 0 | $0 \%$ |
| 0 | $0 \%$ |

Population 308k

|  | Offences | per 1000 | MSG |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | ---: |
| Robbery |  |  |  |
| Personal | 43 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Business | 3 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
|  | 46 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Burglary |  |  |  |
| Domestic | 32 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| Non-domestic | 264 | 0.9 | 0.9 |
|  | 296 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
|  |  |  |  |
| Vehicle crime | 194 | 0.6 | 0.6 |
| Shoplifting | 742 | 2.4 | 2.4 |
| Other stealing | 2,773 | 9.0 | 9.0 |
| Stealing | 4,051 | 13.1 | 13.1 |
| Source: Home Office Crime Statistics 2011/12 |  |  |  |


RECORDED OFFENCES - NON VICTIM BASED
2011/12 per 1,000 population





Population 308k

| Difference |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| 0 | $0 \%$ |
| 0 | $0 \%$ |
| 0 | $0 \%$ |
|  |  |
| 0 | $0 \%$ |
| 0 | $0 \%$ |
| 0 | $0 \%$ |
| 0 | $0 \%$ |

[^13]SANCTION DETECTIONS - NON VICTIM BASED



|  | 2008/09 | 2011/12 | Change | MSG |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Victim based | 5,565 | 4,851 | -13\% | -13\% |
| Non victim based | 1,290 | 1,082 | -16\% | -16\% |
| Total exc fraud | 6,855 | 5,933 | -13\% | -13\% |
| Fraud \& forgery | 420 | 186 | -56\% | -56\% |
| All crime | 7,275 | 6,119 | -16\% | -16\% |

RECORDED OFFENCES - VICTIM BASED
Change 2008/09 to 2011/12

RECORDED OFFENCES - VIOLENCE AGAINST THE PERSON Change 2008/09 to 2011/12


RECORDED OFFENCES - STEALING
Change 2008/09 to 2011/12


Population 308 k

|  | 2008/09 | 2011/12 | Change | MSG |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Robbery |  |  |  |  |
| Personal | 35 | 43 | 23\% | 23\% |
| Business | 8 | 3 | -63\% | -63\% |
|  | 43 | 46 | 7\% | 7\% |
| Burglary |  |  |  |  |
| Domestic | 51 | 32 | -37\% | -37\% |
| Non-domestic | 319 | 264 | -17\% | -17\% |
|  | 370 | 296 | -20\% | -20\% |
| Vehicle crime | 224 | 194 | -13\% | -13\% |
| Shoplifting | 947 | 742 | -22\% | -22\% |
| Other stealing | 3,040 | 2,773 | -9\% | -9\% |
| Stealing | 4,624 | 4,051 | -12\% | -12\% |

Page 83
RECORDED OFFENCES - NON VICTIM BASED
Change 2008/09 to 2011/12

| 300\% | Drug trafficking |
| :---: | :---: |
| 200\% |  |
| 100\% - |  |
| $\begin{array}{r} 0 \% \\ -100 \% \end{array}$ |  |
|  |  |
| a |  |
| 60\% Drug possession |  |
| 40\% - Drug possession |  |
| 20\% |  |
| 0\% | - |
| -20\% $\longrightarrow$ |  |
| -20\% $-40 \%$ - |  |
| -60\% |  |
|  | a |




 CHANGE IN SANCTION DETECTIONS \% Victim based
Non victim based
All crime exc fraud \& forgery
Fraud \& forgery
Victim based
Violence against the person
Sexual offences
Stealing
Criminal damage \& arson
Non victim based
Public disorder
Drug offences
Crimes disrupted
Other non victim based
Violence against the person (VAP)
VAP with injury
VAP without Injury
Sexual offences
Rape
Other sexual offences
Stealing
Personal robbery
Business robbery
Domestic burglary
Non Domestic burglary
Vehicle crime
Shoplifting
Other stealing
Drugs
Drug trafficking
Drug possession
Note: Please be aware that community resolutions / restorative justice may impact on changes in sanction detection rates.


These charts show how different types of
sanction detections are used.

[^14]CHANGES IN DETECTION TYPES
Changes 2008/09 to 2011/12
CHANGES IN DETECTION TYPES
Changes 2008/09 to 2011/12


[^15]

|  | 2008/09 | $\mathbf{2 0 1 1 / 1 2}$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: |
| Charge summons | $60 \%$ | $58 \%$ |
| Cautions | $17 \%$ | $22 \%$ |
| Penalty notices | $2 \%$ | $2 \%$ |
| Cannabis warnings | $19 \%$ | $16 \%$ |
| Taken into consideration | $2 \%$ | $1 \%$ |
| Total | $100 \%$ | $100 \%$ |
| Source: Home Office Crime Statistics $2011 / 12$ |  |  |


These charts and tables show the overall charge rates and
compare them with the expected charge rates. The expected
charge rates show what the force would have achieved if they
had matched the average for each crime type. The term
charges relates to crime offences cleared up by means of
charge or summons.

|  | Offences | Charges | $\%$ | MSG |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Victim based |  |  |  |  |
| VAP with injury | 260 | 98 | $38 \%$ | $38 \%$ |
| VAP without Injury | 274 | 96 | $35 \%$ | $35 \%$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Rape | 2 | 2 | $100 \%$ | $100 \%$ |
| Other sexual offences | 33 | 6 | $18 \%$ | $18 \%$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Domestic burglary | 32 | 2 | $6 \%$ | $6 \%$ |
| Non-domestic burglary | 264 | 47 | $18 \%$ | $18 \%$ |
| Robbery of personal property | 43 | 14 | $33 \%$ | $33 \%$ |
| Business robbery | 3 | 1 | $33 \%$ | $33 \%$ |
| Vehicle crime | 194 | 30 | $15 \%$ | $15 \%$ |
| Shoplifting | 742 | 315 | $42 \%$ | $42 \%$ |
| Other stealing | 2,773 | 258 | $9 \%$ | $9 \%$ |
| Criminal damage \& arson | 231 | 28 | $12 \%$ | $12 \%$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Non-victim based |  |  |  |  |
| Public disorder | 177 | 76 | $43 \%$ | $43 \%$ |
| Drug trafficking | 27 | 21 | $78 \%$ | $78 \%$ |
| Drug possession | 679 | 99 | $15 \%$ | $15 \%$ |
| Crimes disrupted | 126 | 98 | $78 \%$ | $78 \%$ |
| Other non victim based | 73 | 25 | $34 \%$ | $34 \%$ |
| Total exc fraud | 5,933 | 1,216 | $20 \%$ | $20 \%$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Fraud \& forgery | 95 | $51 \%$ | $51 \%$ |  |
| All crime | 1,311 | $21 \%$ | $21 \%$ |  |
| Source: Home Office Crime Statistics | $2011 / 12$ |  |  |  |

NO CRIME


|  |  |
| :---: | :---: |
|  |  |
|  |  |

These charts show the 'no crime rate ' (number of
'no crimes ' divided by total recorded crime).
This information gives a more rounded picture of a
forces crime recording practises.
A crime could be no crimed where it is considered
to have been recorded in error or where, having
been recorded, additional verifiable information
becomes available that determines that no crime
was committed.
Outliers in the table below are highlighted for those
in the top and bottom 10\% nationally.

|  | $\mathbf{2 0 0 8 / 0 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 9 / 1 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 0 / 1 1}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 1 / 1 2}$ | Average |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :--- |
| Burglary | $3.9 \%$ | $2.6 \%$ | $3.2 \%$ | $3.6 \%$ | $2.0 \%$ | $\ll$ |
| Robbery | $17.3 \%$ | $14.0 \%$ | $15.7 \%$ | $22.0 \%$ | $5.1 \%$ | $\ll$ |
| Other stealing | $6.3 \%$ | $6.7 \%$ | $6.1 \%$ | $5.0 \%$ | $5.4 \%$ |  |
| Rape | $80.0 \%$ | $30.0 \%$ | $25.0 \%$ | $71.4 \%$ | $12.5 \%$ | $\ll$ |
| Other sexual | $18.4 \%$ | $24.4 \%$ | $11.8 \%$ | $17.5 \%$ | $5.6 \%$ | $\ll$ |
| Criminal damage | $9.9 \%$ | $8.8 \%$ | $11.7 \%$ | $2.5 \%$ | $2.4 \%$ |  |

Source: Home Office Crime Statistics 2011/12
$17.3 \% \quad 14.0 \%-15.7 \% \quad 22.0 \% \quad 5.1 \% \ll \quad$ The proportion of 'no crimes' does not in itself infer high or low compliance with the overall practice and the IT systems in use. A police force having a high level of 'no crimes' may be indicative of that force having a local recording process that captures all reports as crimes at the first point of contact and before any further investigation has taken place to consider the full facts.
Please note:
OVERALL SATISFACTION
2011/12 percentage satisfied

Source: Victims of Crime Survey 2011/12

1. Victim-based
1.1. Violence against the person
2. Victim-based
1.1. Violence against the person
1.1.1. Violence with injury
$1 \quad$ Murder
1.1.1. Violence with injury
$1 \quad$ Murder
Offences included in each category
Appendix 1 - Crime Codes Infanticide
Manslaught
Manslaughter
Attempted murder
Attempted murder
Causing death by aggravated vehicle taking
Corporate manslaughter
Corporate manslaughter
Intentional destruction of a viable unborn child
Causing death by dangerous driving
Causing death by careless driving under influence of drink or drugs
Causing or allowing death of child or vulnerable person
Causing or allowing death of child or vulnerable person
Causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving
Historic code
Historic code
Causing death by driving: unlicensed drivers etc.
Wounding or carrying out an act endangering life (GBH with intent)
Use of substance or object to endanger life
Inflicting grievous bodily harm without intent
Actually bodily harm and other injury
Less serious wounding
$8 \mathrm{H} \quad$ Racially or religiously aggravated inflicting grievous bodily harm without intent 8J Racially or religiously aggravated actual bodily harm and other injury 8K Poisoning or female genital mutilation
1.1.2. Violence without injury (excl crime prevention and public order offences, inc kidnapping) Historic - harassment and public fear
Historic - harassment and public fear (RRA)
Racially or religiously aggravated harassment
Harassment
Endangering railway passengers
Threat or conspiracy to murder
Threats to kill
Conspiracy to murder
Kidnapping
Procuring illegal abortion
Child abduction
Abandoning child under two years
Cruelty to and neglect of children
Racially or religiously aggravated assault without injury
Assault without injury
$8 C$
8 E
8 M
8 L
7
6
3
3 B
3 A
36
14
13
12
11
$105 B$
$105 A$
104
104 Assault without injury on a constable
Sexual offences
1.2.1. Rape
Rape of a female
Rape of a male
Rape of a female aged 16 and over
Rape of a female child under 16
Rape of a male aged 16 and over

Rape of a male child under 13

> 1.2.2. Other sexual offences (excluding rape)


太눋ㅇNにホ
Sexual activity etc with a person with a mental disorder Abuse of children through prostitution and pornography
Sexual assault on a male child under 13 Sexual assault on a female aged 13 and over Sexual assault on a female child under 13 Sexual activity involving a child under 13 Causing sexual activity without consent Sexual activity involving child under 16 Incest or familial sexual offences


1.3. Acquisitive crime

### 1.3.1. Burglary

### 1.3.1.1. Domestic burglary

 28 Domestic Burglary Burglary in a dwelling Attempted burglary in a dwelling Distraction burglary in a dwelling$\begin{array}{ll}28 \mathrm{C} & \text { Distraction burglary in a dwelling } \\ 28 \mathrm{D} & \text { Attempted distraction burglary in a dwelling } \\ 29 & \text { Aggravated burglary in a dwelling }\end{array}$
Aggravated burglary in a dwelling
28 Attempted distraction burglary in a dwelling
1.3.1.2. Non-domestic burglary

30 Historic code
30A Burglary in a building other than a dwelling
 31 Aggravated burglary in a building other than a dwelling 30 Historic code

### 1.3.2.1. Robbery - personal

 34B Robbery of personal property 1.3.2.2. Robbery - business34A Robbery of business
1.3.3. Vehicle crime
37.2 Aggravated vehicle taking

Theft or unauthorised taking of motor vehicle
2.0007 - of which, attempted theft of a vehicle

126 Interfering with a motor vehicle
45 Theft from vehicle
1.3.4. Shoplifting

46 Shoplifting
1．3．5．Other acquisitive crime 39 Theft from the person $40 \quad$ Theft in a dwelling other than from an automatic machine or meter Theft or unauthorised taking of a pedal cycle Other theft
Blackmail
Theft by an employee
Dishonest use of electricity
Dishonest use of electricity
Theft from automatic machine or meter
53B Preserved other fraud and repealed fraud offences（pre Fraud Act 2006）

## 1．4．Criminal damage $\&$ arson

56 Arson
$\begin{array}{ll}58 \mathrm{~F} & \text { Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a building other than a dwelling } \\ 58 \mathrm{G} & \text { Racially or religiously aggravated criminal damage to a vehicle } \\ 58 \mathrm{H} & \text { Racially or religiously aggravated other criminal damage }\end{array}$
2．Non victim－based Crime
2．1．Public disorder
Racially or religiously aggravated public fear，alarm or distress
Riot
Violent disorder
Other offences against the State or public order
Treason
Treason－felony
$9 A$
$9 B$
64
65
66
62
63
2.2. Drug offences
2.2.1. Drug trafficking
92A Trafficking in
92A Trafficking in controlled drugs
2.2.2. Drug possession 92C Other drug offences
92D Possession of controlled drugs (excl. cannabis)
92B Historic code possession of controlled drugs

### 2.3. Crimes disrupted

8B Historic code - possession of weapons 5C Possession of items to endanger life
10A Possession of firearms with intent
10B Possession of firearms offences
10C Possession of other weapons
Possession of article with blade or
Going equipped for stealing, etc
Possession of articles for use in fraud
Handling stolen goods
Threat or possession with intent to commit criminal damage Possession of false documents
Other knife offences

Obscene publications etc
Protection from eviction
Adulteration of food
Public health offences
Planning laws
Disclosure, obstruction, false or misleading statements etc Other notifiable offences (class 98/99)
Dangerous driving
Fraud, forgery etc associated with vehicle or driver records
Fraud, forgery etc associated with vehicle or driver records
Soliciting for the purposes of prostitution
Exploitation of prostitution
Profiting from or concealing knowledge of the proceeds of crime
Offender management act
Offender management act
Making or supplying articles
Making or supplying articles for use in fraud
3. Fraud \& forgery

## Fraud by company director

presentation: cheque, plastic card and online bank accounts (not PSP) Fraud by false representation: other frauds
Fraud by failing to disclose information
Forgery or use of false drug prescription
Other forgery
Cheque and credit card fraud (pre Fraud Act 2006)
Obtaining services dishonestly (to be discontinued) $53 C$
$53 D$
$53 E$
$53 F$
51
52
53 53C 53F
60
61 53A

6) Intelligence
a. Central intelligence command team and support overheads
b. Intelligence analysis / threat assessments
c. Intelligence gathering

f. Investigative support command team and support overheads
11) Police authority
a. Democratic representation
b. Police authority support
c. Other costs
d. Yreasury management
e. Internal audit
12) Central costs
a. Revenue contribution to capital
b. Capital financing
c. Pensions and exit costs
Outsourcing of Custody
Forces who outsource custody (as at 26/07/2012)


## 

Restorative Justice / Community resolutions
Forces who return data on RJ / CR (to Mar-12)


## HMIC Value for Money Analysis

The Value for Money profile 2012 has been broken down into a simplified table form for the areas where the force has been deemed to be an "outlier" or is at the extremes of the profiles. The headings are the cost of the service for City of London Police and the national average. Where a ranking of forces is appropriate this has also been included with a comparison with previous VfM reports. The areas profiled are not always the same therefore a ranking year to year comparison is not always available. Where possible an amended value after the City First change programme is included as an indicator of future cost. A future ranking is not possible to calculate as other forces are also undergoing change programmes which would affect their rankings. Profiles showing (Corporation) are those identified by the Chamberlains Department as being of interest.

## OVERALL EXPENDITURE - Total excluding national functions p11

The City of London Police, due to its location, unique nature and remit, has always been an outlier in terms of cost per head of population, even when referenced to its business population. The population figure for this reporting period has also decreased from 316K to 308K compared to 2011.

- Policing costs per head of population (Corporation)

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK <br> 2011 | RANK <br> $2010 / 11$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 259$ | $£ 189$ | 1 | 1 | 2 |

- Police Officer costs per head of population (Corporation)

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK <br> 2012 | RANK <br> 2011 | RANK <br> $2010 / 11$ | City 1st |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 171$ | $£ 111$ | 1 | 1 | 2 | $£ 140$ |

- Police Staff costs per head of population (Corporation)

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK <br> 2012 | RANK <br> 2011 | RANK <br> $2010 / 11$ | City 1st |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 52$ | $£ 40$ | 2 | 2 | 13 | $£ 51$ |

- Workforce costs per head of population

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 229$ | $£ 158$ | 1 | 1 | 2 |

London Weighting and London Allowance add $£ 6,615$ to the salary of a police officer in the City of London, which for a midpoint Constable is an extra $20 \%$ on top of their basic salary. Police Staff also
receive allowances for working in London. London Weighting for police staff amounts to $£ 4,780$ per year, for a grade C this equates to an additional $22 \%$ of their basic salary and these combined are a major contributory factor in making the force an outlier in these areas. The figure for police officer costs after City First would be $£ 140$ due to the reduction in police numbers by 120 . For police staff costs would be $£ 51$ as the workforce has not reduced significantly in comparison to police numbers.

- Non-staff costs per head of population

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK <br> 2012 | RANK <br> 2011 | RANK <br> $2010 / 11$ | City 1st |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 101$ | $£ 43$ | 1 | 1 | 1 | $£ 71$ |

In relation to non-pay costs the Force does not benefit from the economies of scale in comparison to other forces. The cost of services in London is also not taken into account by the profile. The force whenever appropriate, procures services in partnership with the Corporation. The City First change programme is also looking at non-staff costs and estimate that the future cost will be reduced to $£ 71$ due to decreased numbers of staff

- Earned Income per head of population (Corporation)

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK <br> 2012 | RANK <br> 2011 | RANK <br> $2010 / 11$ | City 1st |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 37$ | $£ 8$ | 1 | 1 | 1 | $£ 37$ |

Earned income includes partnership income, and amounts to $£ 11.4 \mathrm{M}$. This figure includes all nonHome Office/Government grants, such as the funding provided for the Dedicated Cheque Plastic Credit Unit (DCPCU), Insurance Fraud Enforcement Department (IFED) and the Overseas AntiCorruption Unit (OACU) and from Transport for London (TfL) for the Safer Transport Operations Team and London Safety Camera Partnership, and the City of London for Tower Bridge. The figures after City first should remain the same as it is assumed that these current funding streams will still be in place.

## POLICE OFFICERS 2012/13 estimates per head of population p12

- Total Officer costs per head

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { RANK } \\ & 2011 \end{aligned}$ | RANK 2010/11 | City 1st |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| £171 | £111 | 1 | 1 | 2 | £140 |

- Police officers (exc. overtime)

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK <br> 2012 | RANK <br> 2011 | RANK <br> $2010 / 11$ | City 1st |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 167$ | $£ 107$ | 1 | 1 | 2 | $£ 135$ |

London Weighting and London Allowance add $£ 6,615$ to the salary of a police officer in the City of London, which for a midpoint Constable is an extra $20 \%$ on top of their basic salary. The figure for police officer costs after City First would be $£ 140$ due to the reduction in police numbers by 120. The figure excluding overtime after City First is $£ 135$ and is based on overtime remaining roughly the same

- Police officer overtime \% of salary for National functions and other

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $2.6 \%$ | $3.2 \%$ | 37 | 37 | $\mathbf{3 0}$ |

Police Officer overtime is calculated based on basic pay only, which excludes London allowance and weighting. Therefore, the overtime cost will represent a smaller proportion of the overall salary cost in comparison to other Forces. The previous examples highlight the many anomalies within the VFM profiles when applied to the City of London Police. Where the more expensive London salaries are included we are an outlier at the top end but when they are removed, as they are with the police overtime example, we are an outlier at the bottom end.

Police staff and PCSO 2012/13 estimates $£$ per head of population p13

- Police staff

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK <br> 2012 | RANK <br> 2011 | RANK <br> $2010 / 11$ | City 1st |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 52.2$ | $£ 40.2$ | 2 | 2 | 13 | $£ 51$ |

- Police staff cost per FTE

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK <br> 2012 | RANK <br> 2011 | RANK <br> $2010 / 11$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 38.6 \mathrm{k}$ | $£ 32.2 \mathrm{k}$ | $\mathbf{1}$ | 1 | 1 |

- PCSOs FTE/1000

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK <br> 2012 | RANK <br> 2011 | RANK <br> $2010 / 11$ | City 1st |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 0.17 | 0.25 | 42 | 41 | 42 | 0.051 |

- PCSO cost per FTE

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK <br> $\mathbf{2 0 1 2}$ | RANK <br> $\mathbf{2 0 1 1}$ | RANK <br> $\mathbf{2 0 1 0 / 1 1}$ | City 1st |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 35.6 \mathrm{k}$ | $£ 29.8 \mathrm{k}$ | $\mathbf{1}$ | $\mathbf{1}$ | $\mathbf{1}$ | $\mathbf{£ 3 5 k}$ |

The Value for Money Profile indicates that the Force has a relatively low proportion of PCSO's. There is a complement of 52, however turnover is high and efforts to maintain this figure result in some variance around 52. If the Force followed the national average ratio of PCSO's per thousand of population (currently 0.24 ) the COLP would employ 79 PCSOs. . The number of PCSOs has reduced from 38 to 16 under City First reducing the percentage to 0.052 . Another factor is London Weighting for police staff which amounts to $£ 4,780$ per year. For a grade $C$ this equates to an additional $22 \%$ of their basic salary. This would increase the cost for police staff inside London as opposed to regional forces.

The overall figure for police staff figure after City First would be $£ 51$ as there is little change from the current budgeted numbers.

NON STAFF COSTS AS \% OF WORKFORCE COSTS p14 (Corporation)

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK <br> 2012 | RANK <br> 2011 | RANK <br> $2010 / 11$ | City 1st |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $43.1 \%$ | $25.3 \%$ | 3 | 2 | 1 | $37.9 \%$ |

- Supplies \& Services

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $29.4 \%$ | $13.6 \%$ | 3 | 2 | 8 |

In relation to non-pay costs the Force does not benefit from the economies of scale in comparison to other forces. Also the increased cost of services in London is not taken into account by the profile. The force whenever appropriate procures services in partnership with the Corporation. The City First change programme is also looking at non-staff costs and estimate that the future cost will be reduced to 37.9\%

This figure also includes IT costs which are comparably higher than other Forces due to lack economies of scale. In order to address this issue, the Force is participating in a consortium with other Forces in the South East (ECIS) which will drive down future costs in this area.

FINANCING OF EXPENDITURE per head of population p15

- Net expenditure (Corporation)

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK <br> 2011 | RANK <br> $2010 / 11$ | City 1st |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 293$ | $£ 194$ | 1 | 1 | 2 | $£ 270$ |

London Weighting and London Allowance add $£ 6,615$ to the salary of a police officer in the City of London, which for a midpoint Constable is an extra $20 \%$ on top of their basic salary. Police Staff also receive allowances for working in London. London Weighting for police staff amounts to $£ 4,780$ per year, for a grade $C$ this equates to an additional $22 \%$ of their basic salary and these combined are a major contributory factor in making the force an outlier in these areas. The population size of 308k is also a factor in this and many other areas

- Central Funding

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK <br> 2012 | RANK <br> 2011 | RANK <br> $2010 / 11$ | City 1st |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 286$ | $£ 134$ | 1 | 6 | 1 | $£ 270$ |

As can be seen, the Force is heavily funded by the centre due to the fact that it does not receive any money from a precept on council tax. However, it does receive a business rate premium of approximately $£ 4 \mathrm{M}$ which has been included in the funding formula. The future cost of central funding is $£ 270$ as a result of staff reductions.

- Specific Grants

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK <br> 2012 | RANK <br> 2011 | RANK <br> $2010 / 11$ | City 1st |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 83$ | $£ 14$ | 1 | N/A | N/A | $£ 73$ |

Specific grants are high due to the national capability funding the Force receives for both Economic Crime and Dedicated Security Posts (DSP).

After City First specific grants are $£ 73$, assuming a reduction in current grant funding in line with the overall reduction in police budgets. Although this may change if Capital City Funding is received.

## EARNED INCOME p16

- Total earned income per head of population

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 36.9$ | $£ 7.8$ | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Earned income includes partnership income, and amounts to $£ 11.4 \mathrm{M}$. This figure includes all nonHome Office/Government grants, such as the funding provided for the Dedicated Cheque Plastic Card Unit (DCPCU), Insurance Fraud Enforcement Department (IFED) and the Overseas AntiCorruption Unit (OACU) and from Transport for London (TfL) for the Safer Transport Operations Team and London Safety Camera Partnership, and the City of London for Tower Bridge.

The figures after City first should remain the same as it is assumed that these current funding streams will still be in place.

- Salaries Fees Charges \& Rent

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK <br> 2012 | RANK <br> 2011 | RANK <br> $2010 / 11$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 4$ | $£ 2.2$ | 3 | 1 | N/A |

The bulk of this ( $£ 0.5 \mathrm{M}$ ) is from the Section House charges for accommodation, and the Fraud Academy (£0.45M). It also includes the charges we make to UKBA for use of Custody facilities, and vehicle pound income.

City First have assumed zero additional income at present for the Fraud Academy beyond the $£ 0.45 \mathrm{~m}$ shown below, but this may increase with the planned future expansion of the Fraud Academy .

- Reimbursed Income exc collaboration

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 7$ | $£ 1.9$ | $\mathbf{3}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ | N/A |

The majority of this ( $£ 1 \mathrm{M}$ ) relates to seconded officers to other forces or national agencies. There is also money received for mutual aid during the 2012 Olympics ( $£ 0.5 \mathrm{M}$ ) and private service income from the Tactical Firearms Group for high security escorts for the Bank of England (£0.5M).

- Partnership Income

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 25.9$ | $£ 1.6$ | 1 | 3 | N/A |

Earned income includes partnership income, and amounts to $£ 11.4 \mathrm{M}$. This figure includes all nonHome Office/Government grants, such as the funding provided for the Dedicated Cheque Plastic Credit Unit (DCPCU), Insurance Fraud Enforcement Department (IFED) and the Overseas Anti-

Corruption Unit (OACU) and from Transport for London (TfL) for the Safer Transport Operations Team and London Safety Camera Partnership, and the City of London for Tower Bridge.

Funding source trends, £ per 1000 p17

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 293.5$ | $£ 193.81$ | N/A | N/A | N/A |

The Force is heavily reliant on central government funding (funds $75 \%$ of its total expenditure), and does not receive any income from the council tax precept. This measure is also per head of population, which is low.

WORKFORCE SUMMARY per 1000 population p18

- PCSOs

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK <br> 2012 | RANK <br> 2011 | RANK <br> $2010 / 11$ | City 1st |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 0.12 | 0.24 | 42 | 42 | 41 | 0.052 |

If the Force followed the national average ratio of PCSO's per thousand of population (currently 0.24 ) the COLP would employ 79 PCSOs which would be far in excess of the actual numbers required and the funding available. The number of PCSOs has reduced from 38 to 16 under City First reducing the percentage to 0.052 as a consequence we will remain as an outlier in this area.

## POLICE OFFICERS/PCSOs by rank and \% of FTE p19 - (Corporation)

- Sergeants

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK <br> 2012 | RANK <br> 2011 | RANK <br> $2010 / 11$ | City 1st |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $16.2 \%$ | $14.3 \%$ | 1 | 11 | 2 | $16.9 \%$ |

- Superintendents (inc chiefs)

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK <br> 2012 | RANK <br> 2011 | RANK <br> $2010 / 11$ | City 1st |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $2 \%$ | $0.9 \%$ | 1 | 1 | 1 | $1.9 \%$ |

- Constables per Sgt

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK <br> 2012 | RANK <br> 2011 | RANK <br> $2010 / 11$ | City 1st |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $4.2 \%$ | $4.8 \%$ | 39 | 29 | 40 | $4.2 \%$ |

- Constables \& PCSOs per Sgt

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK <br> 2012 | RANK <br> 2011 | RANK <br> $2010 / 11$ | City 1st |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $4.5 \%$ | $5.6 \%$ | 42 | 40 | 42 | $4.3 \%$ |

- PCSOs

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK <br> 2012 | RANK <br> 2011 | RANK <br> $2010 / 11$ | City 1st |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $4.4 \%$ | $10.4 \%$ | 42 | 42 | 42 | $2.2 \%$ |

The Directorate based structure of the Force requires certain levels of senior management. The Superintendent ranks are essential in setting the strategic direction of the Directorates and ensuring they are properly managed. They are responsible for many diverse areas of work within the Force unlike many other forces where the rank is based solely on the numbers of people managed.

The small increase in the number of Sergeants per FTE has been as a result of having more Sergeant posts in the Economic Crime Directorate. Much of the work in ECD is complex and often has national consequences; it therefore requires additional levels of supervision.

The freeze on recruitment has had an effect on the number of constables per sergeant this will move more in line with the national average when recruitment recommences in the future.

If the Force followed the national average ratio of PCSO's per thousand of population (currently 0.24 ) the COLP would employ 79 PCSOs which would be far in excess of the actual numbers required and the funding available. The number of PCSOs has reduced from 38 to 16 under City First reducing the per FTE to $2.2 \%$ as a consequence the per FTE will remain as an outlier in this area as will the number per sergeant

## WORKFORCE \& CRIME TRENDS p20

- Crimes/Officer

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 7 | 30 | N/A | N/A | N/A |

- Charges/Officer

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1.5 | 5.2 | N/A | N/A | N/A |

- $\%$ crime victim-based


The City of London Police has had a steady rate of crime reduction in the past 10 years and in doing so has made the City a safer place for our community to live and work. The continued focus on crime reduction should ensure we remain below the national average even with reduced officer numbers.

## COMMUNITY POLICE OFFICERS \& CRIME p21

- Total crime exc fraud per CPO

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 19 | 59 | $\mathbf{4 2}$ | $\mathbf{4 2}$ | $\mathbf{4 2}$ |

As mentioned above the CoLP deals with less crime than other Forces and with the continued focus on crime reduction this is as expected. As a result of the City First change programme this is likely to change, in the medium term, as there will be less officers defined as 'Community Police Officers' which may bring us more into line with other Forces.

## ARREST TO CHARGE p22 -

Arrests per 100 crimes (Corporation)

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 69 | 69 | 2 | N/A | N/A |

This figure shows a high proportion of arrests per crime, which highlights the excellent work done through the Crime Directorate ensuring that appropriate resources are allocated to investigation and that officers are tasked in accordance with the prevailing intelligence picture. However Community Police Officers manage few crimes but in line with the rest of the force they do convert most crimes to arrest action.

## FORCE BREAKDOWN AGAINST GROUP AVERAGE - STAFF p23

## LEAVERS' p25

Police Officer leavers have been at a constant level throughout 2011/12. The reasons continue to be retirements and transfers. There was an average of 4 per month (similar to previous years), with retirements making up $90 \%$ of this category.

PCSO leavers - PCSO leavers have totalled 6 in the year. The prospect of the impact of the City First change programme on PCSO numbers within the Force has been the main reason for this.

JOINERS' p26

As a result of the freeze on officer recruitment thee have been no permanent Officer or PCSO joiners during this period

## Sickness \& Recuperative restricted p27 (Corporation)

- Police Officers Long term Absence

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1.1 \%$ | $1.7 \%$ | 36 | 36 | 36 |

- Police Officers short \& medium term absence

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1 \%$ | $2.1 \%$ | 40 |  |  |

- Police Officers recuperative Duties

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $0.5 \%$ | $\mathbf{2 . 1 \%}$ | 39 | $\mathbf{4 2}$ | N/A |

The force continues to robustly manage sickness absence for both Officers and Support Staff. This is done through continual scrutiny and analysis of the sickness absence data and specifically targeted support to managers dealing with the individual cases. The force also continues to support the return to full fitness and full duties through a programme of supported 'restricted' duties for Officers. All long term sickness absences are managed through meetings with the Head of HR Services and are an agenda items at force performance meetings.

WORKFORCE BY FUNCTION p29/30
Net Revenue expenditure by Function per head of population p30-

- Total exc national (Corporation)

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 258.9$ | $£ 189.4$ | 1 | 1 | N/A |

- Specialist Operations

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 26.1$ | $£ 8.7$ | 1 | 1 | 1 |

London Weighting and London Allowance add $£ 6,615$ to the salary of a police officer in the City of London, which for a midpoint Constable is an extra $20 \%$ on top of their basic salary. Police Staff also
receive allowances for working in London. London Weighting for police staff amounts to $£ 4,780$ per year, for a grade C this equates to an additional $22 \%$ of their basic salary and these combined are a major contributory factor in making the force an outlier in these areas. The Specialist Operations profile for the Force is high due to the nature of force area and the continuing terrorist Threat. The Force also provides public order \& search capability for a number of high profile operations including support to Pan London operations. The demand on Specialist Operations is also driven by operational need rather than population which also contribute to the Force being an outlier in this area. However this profile is likely to flatten as the projected number of officers involved in Specialist Operations will decrease as a result of reduced officer numbers.

- Intelligence

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 11.6$ | $£ 7.7$ | 1 | 8 | 16 |

In any Intelligence Bureau there needs to be specific capability to cover key functionality such as crime types, international checks, ANPR, Organised Crime Groups and general analytical and research capability. Therefore these posts are necessary regardless of force population as this is not a true picture of workload and output. Due to the nature and of the City Of London Policing area there is an increased threat from Domestic Extremism and Terrorism which requires increased resources not relevant in many other forces.

- Investigations

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 31.4$ | $£ 15.4$ | 1 | 2 | 3 |

The Forces responsibility as national lead force for Economic Crime and our policing plan priority for Economic crime requires additional investigative resources in this area. The Major Investigation Team provide a detective capability in dealing with major crime in the City of London. By providing resources in these areas the force is able to maintain a high sanction detection rate, while providing a first class crime investigation service to the business and residential community.

- Support Functions

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 68.3$ | $£ 39$ | $\mathbf{1}$ | $\mathbf{1}$ | N/A |

- Police Authority

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 0.1$ | $£ 1.2$ | N/A | N/A | N/A |

- Central Costs (Corporation)


These costs include all of the Force on costs levied by the City of London Corporation and also all our central costs such as HR and Finance. Yet again although a small force we still have a requirement to provide central services in the same way that a large Force provides. This coupled with the size of the population and London costs explain the difference in cost figures.

LOCAL POLICING inc local investigation/prisoner processing p31/32 cost per head of population

- Total local policing

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 54.5$ | $£ 75.4$ | $\mathbf{4 1}$ | $\mathbf{4 2}$ | $\mathbf{2 2}$ |

- Local Investigation

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 8$ | $£ 14.1$ | 41 | 38 | N/A |

- Police Officer salaries

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 48.1$ | $£ 62.6$ | 41 | 39 | N/A |

- Police Overtime

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 0.7$ | $£ 1.8$ | $\mathbf{4 1}$ | $\mathbf{4 2}$ | N/A |

- Other (Police) staff salaries

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 0.4$ | $£ 2.4$ | $\mathbf{4 2}$ | $\mathbf{4 1}$ | N/A |

- Non Staff Costs

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 1.1$ | $£ 2.4$ | $\mathbf{3 6}$ | 39 | N/A |

The Force has traditionally had a lower proportion of officers designated as Local Policing officers based on head of population in comparison to other forces due to the structure and focus of the Territorial Policing Directorate. This indicator is likely to decrease as the number of officers assigned
to local policing decrease. This, in turn, will show the Force as providing better value, at less cost per head of population that other Forces.

## DEALING WITH THE PUBLIC p33

## EMERGENCY \& PRIORITY CALLS PER POPULATION p36

The Force has very few Emergency, Crime and Anti-social behaviour calls in relation to other forces and using the population numbers in the profile we will continue to be at the low end of the scale in these areas.

## CRIMINAL JUSTICE ARRANGEMENTS p37

Surgeons, Drs \& other medical staff

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 2.04$ | $£ 1.02$ | 3 | N/A | N/A |

The Force pays a fixed amount for the provision of medical services rather than per prisoner or callout. A Healthcare Professional (HCP) is on duty within the custody facility from 07:00-19:00 each day. This combined with the relatively small number of prisoners' leads to a higher cost for the provision of HCPs that might otherwise be the case. This costs allows for a quicker service enabling cases to be processed quickly therefore reducing officer time in custody.

## CRIMINAL JUSTICE ARRANGEMENTS p38 - (income)

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1.5 | 5.2 | N/A | N/A | N/A |

The Force receives income from London Safety Partnerships \& Tower Bridge Camera Enforcement which would account for our high position in this area. The increased staff costs are again down to the 'London Factor'.

## SPECIALIST OPERATIONS - cost per head of population

- Total specialist operations costs

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 26.1$ | $£ 8.7$ | 1 | 1 | 1 |

- Firearms unit

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 9.2$ | $£ 3.1$ | 1 | 1 | 1 |

- Dogs section

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 3.9$ | $£ 1.4$ | $\mathbf{1}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ | $\mathbf{1}$ |

- Level 1 public order

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 7$ | $£ 1.5$ | 1 | $\mathbf{2 4}$ | N/A |

- Civil Contingencies

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 2.2$ | $£ 0.7$ | N/A | N/A | N/A |

- Mounted police

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 3.1$ | $£ 0.2$ | N/A | N/A | N/A |

The Specialist Operations profile for the Force is high due to the nature of force area and the continuing terrorist Threat. The Force also provides public order \& search capability for a number of high profile operations including support to Pan London operations. The demand on Specialist Operations is also driven by operational need rather than population which also contribute to the Force being an outlier in this area. However this profile is likely to flatten as the projected number of officers involved in Specialist Operations will decrease as a result of reduced officer numbers. Also London Weighting and London Allowance add $£ 6,615$ to the salary of a police officer in the City of London, which for a midpoint Constable is an extra $20 \%$ on top of their basic salary. Police Staff also receive allowances for working in London. London Weighting for police staff amounts to $£ 4,780$ per
year, for a grade $C$ this equates to an additional $22 \%$ of their basic salary and these combined are a major contributory factor in making the force an outlier in these areas.

## NTELLIGENCE cost per head of population p42/43

- Total costs

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 11.6$ | $£ 7.7$ | 1 | 8 | N/A |

- Intel Analyst/Threat assessment

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 6.9$ | $£ 3.8$ | $\mathbf{2}$ | $\mathbf{4 2}$ | N/A |

In any Intelligence Bureau there needs to be specific capability to cover key functionality such as crime types, international checks, ANPR, Organised Crime Groups and general analytical and research capability. Therefore these posts are necessary regardless of force population as this is not a true picture of workload and output. Due to the nature of the City Of London Policing area there is an increased threat from Domestic Extremism and Terrorism which requires increased resources not relevant in many other forces.

INVESTIGATIONS exc local investigation/prisoner processing - cost per head of population p44/45

- Total Investigations

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 31.44$ | $£ 15.39$ | 1 | 1 | 3 |

- Police Officer Salaries

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 27.2$ | $£ 11.6$ | 1 | N/A | N/A |

- Public Protection

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 2.32$ | $£ 6.55$ | $\mathbf{4 2}$ | $\mathbf{4 1}$ | N/A |

- Serious and Organised Crime

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 0.20$ | $£ 2.30$ | $\mathbf{4 2}$ | $\mathbf{4 2}$ | N/A |

- Economic Crime

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 17.62$ | $£ 1.42$ | 1 | 1 | 1 |

- Specialist Investigation Units

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 4.30$ | $£ 0.46$ | $\mathbf{2}$ | 1 | 1 |

The Forces responsibility as national lead force for Economic Crime and our policing plan priority for Economic crime requires additional investigative resources in this area. The Major Investigation Team provide a detective capability in dealing with major crime in the City of London. The Public Protection Unit (PPU) is a dedicated resource to investigate the hate crimes and domestic abuse in the Force area. By providing resources in these areas the force is able to maintain a high sanction detection rate, while providing a first class crime investigation service to the business and residential community. Yet again the London based staff costs and small population sample are a contributory factor

INVESTIGATIVE SUPPORT -cost per head of population p46

- External forensic Costs

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 0$ | $£ 1.63$ | N/A | $\mathbf{4 2}$ | N/A |

- Scenes of crime officers

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 2.81$ | $£ 1.56$ | 1 | 1 | N/A |

This business area operates on a minimum level of staff needed to provide 24/7 service and is based on need rather than population numbers. London staff costs are also a contributory factor. The City First change programme is examining this area in relation to collaboration.

SUPPORT FUNCTIONS - cost per head of population p48

- Total Costs

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 68.3$ | $£ 39$ | $\mathbf{1}$ | $\mathbf{1}$ | N/A |

- Building Costs

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 15.5$ | $£ 8.8$ | 2 | 3 | N/A |

- ICT

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 14.6$ | $£ 8.6$ | 1 | 2 | N/A |

- Training

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 6.1$ | $£ 3.9$ | $\mathbf{2}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ | N/A |

- Administration Support

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 11.6$ | $£ 2.7$ | $\mathbf{1}$ | $\mathbf{1}$ | N/A |

- Human Resources

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 5.5$ | $£ 2.4$ | 1 | 1 | 5 |

- Performance review

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 5.4$ | $\mathbf{£ 2 . 5}$ | $\mathbf{1}$ | $\mathbf{1}$ | N/A |

- Professional Standards

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 2.7$ | $£ 1.4$ | 1 | 1 | 7 |

- All Other

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 2.5$ | $£ 4.2$ | N/A | N/A | N/A |

The deliveries of the above functions are based on need and capacity and as such cannot be realistically compared on per head of population numbers. As a small Force we still have to provide these services in order to support our core business of policing and yet again the increased cost of staff in London is the most relevant factor in these areas.

NATIONAL POLICING - cost per head of population p51/52

- Total Costs (Corporation)

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 34.56$ | $£ 4.46$ | $\mathbf{1}$ | 1 | N/A |

- Specific grants

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£ 47.37$ | $£ 3.97$ | N/A | N/A | N/A |

- Costs net of grant

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $£-12.80$ | $£-0.49$ | N/A | N/A | N/A |

Counter Terrorism is the Force number one priority and as a result the Force provides a large officer commitment to supporting the business and residential community in the Square Mile in this area. The $24 / 7$ cover provided contributes to the cost of providing this security function, which is not such a high priority for many other Forces. The lead force status for Economic Crime is also a factor in our national policing costs. The cornerstone of this work is the national fraud operational work, the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau and the Economic Crime and Fraud Training Academy. This national remit based against a small population size places the Force as an outlier in regards of this profile. The costs net of grant are yet again the increased cost of staff in London.

RECORDED OFFENCES - ALL CRIMES per 1000 population p59

- Total exc fraud (Corporation)

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 19.3 |  | $\mathbf{4 2}$ | $\mathbf{4 2}$ | $\mathbf{4 2}$ |

Overall crime (exc Fraud) has fallen within the last 10 years and has gone from approximately 9,000 to 5,600 crimes. This is in part as a consequence to changes in recording practices but in the main it is due to the continued focus on achieving crime reduction year on year and this will continue to be the case in the future. These low crime levels ensure that the City of London is a safe place to live and work.

## SANCTION DETECTIONS (rape) p67 (Corporation)

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $100 \%$ |  | 1 | N/A | N/A |

The sanction detection rate for rape is $100 \%$, although this is based on very few crimes (2). All allegations of sexual offences are thoroughly investigated and Rapes are dealt with by the Force Major Investigation Team (MIT) who are able to provide expert detective capability in dealing with major crimes. They are split into a witness team, suspect team and a CCTV team who are able to provide evidence packages within the first 48 hours. This allied with excellent crime scene management contribute to the high detection rate

## SANCTION DETECTIONS (non-domestic burglary) p69

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $22 \%$ | N/A | 3 | N/A | N/A |

Unlike many regional forces the Force does not have many resident recidivists which make these crimes harder to detect. As a consequence the focus in dealing with burglary is also about the Quality of Service delivered to the victims. Every Burglary secures attendance at the scene by a detective and a scenes of crime officer and crimes cannot be filed away unless authourised by a Detective Inspector. This ensures that all avenues of investigation have been explored and exploited. Moving forward a dedicated Burglary Team with one Detective Sergeant and four Constables is being trialled to try to replicate the good work carried out by the Op Spinetail team who increased detections in thefts from cafe's and licensed premises.

## SANCTION DETECTIONS (drug trafficking) p71

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $78 \%$ | N/A | 41 | N/A | N/A |

The force has very few Drug Trafficking offences (27) none of which are "high value" offences. Many of the offenders are foreign nationals and once bailed often fail to appear for charge/court leading to the $22 \%$ rate shown as not detected.

## RECORDED OFFENCES - ALL CRIMES (fraud \& forgery) p72

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $-56 \%$ | N/A | $\mathbf{4 2}$ | N/A | N/A |

The $56 \%$ fall in offences of fraud \& forgery is a direct result of the force's early adoption of new Home Office reporting procedures. In April 2011, CoLP was one of six pilot forces to adopt these new procedures; in practice all non-urgent fraud reports are now channelled through the Home Office's Action Fraud service. Action Fraud allocates a unique crime reference number to any reports channelled through its call centre or web portal as a result these do not form part of the force's crime return.
All Home Office forces will be complaint with these new procedures by $1^{\text {st }}$ April 2013; we should then see VFM tables start to converge.

## SANCTION DETECTIONS BY TYPE (TIC) p79

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $1 \%$ |  | 42 |  |  |

Taken Into Consideration (TIC) detections are used particularly around repeat offences by known local criminals. Such offenders rarely travel outside of their force area to commit crimes, as such this is a tool used more frequently by regional forces. The City of London has a traditionally high overall crime detection rate and as such TIC detections are not common practice.

## CHANGES IN SANCTION DETECTION TYPES p80

## Cautions

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $22 \%$ | N/A | 1 |  |  |

There has been no policy decision by the Force to increase the number of cautions. This increase is in some part due to the CPS using conditional cautions as an alternative to court appearance. Often the court will direct the defendant to return to the police station to receive a conditional caution. There has also been an increase in voluntary attendances at the police station which may also have led to an increase in cautions. This increase in voluntary attendances was commended during the last HMIC inspection of custody.

## NO CRIME p82

- Robbery

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $22 \%$ | $5.1 \%$ | 1 | N/A | N/A |

- Rape

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $71.4 \%$ | $12.5 \%$ | 1 | N/A | N/A |

- Other sexual offences

| COLP VALUE | AVERAGE | RANK 2012 | RANK 2011 | RANK 2010/11 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $17.5 \%$ | $5.6 \%$ | 1 | N/A | N/A |

## Appendix B

All allegations of sexual offences are thoroughly investigated and as such it often takes considerably more than the three days allowed under National Crime Recording Standards to gather the necessary information to ascertain the full facts. False allegations of rape are not unusual, and in such cases the investigation will lead to the original crime being no-crimed, with the reasons recorded on the enquiry log. This is acknowledged in the note at the bottom of page 82 of the HMIC report, which explains that a high level of "no crimes" may be indicative of recording processes that capture all reports of crimes at first point of contact.

In relation to Robbery many of the no crimes are a result of the thorough investigation process applied to all offences of robbery. Also the small volume of such offences (46) can give a high percentage by no criming relatively few. Where there is substantial evidence to disprove the allegation of robbery, normally by CCTV, they are then no crimed. Many other forces do not investigate with similar vigour "low level" robbery such as purse/phone snatch due to the high volume of these offences in many forces

This page is intentionally left blank

| Committee(s): <br> Police Performance and Resource <br> Management Sub-Committee | Date(s): <br> $8^{\text {th }}$ February 2013 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Subject: <br> Performance against Targets in the Policing Plan, April <br> to December 2012 | Public |
| Report of: <br> Commissioner of Police <br> POL 09/13 | For Information |

## Main Report

## Background

1. This report presents Force performance against the targets and measures published in your Committee's Policing Plan 2012-15 for the first, second and third quarters of the 2012-13 financial year (i.e. April to December 2012). All relevant performance information is contained within Appendix 'A' with only those areas where targets have not been met highlighted within the body of the report itself.
2. As with previous reports, this performance report includes brief overviews of Force performance that are not covered by specific targets.
3. The "traffic light" criteria used in these reports is as follows:

- White - target achieved;
- Green - target on course to be achieved by due date;
- Amber - progress against the target behind schedule or failing, but could still be achieved by due date;
- Red - target not achieved by due date/will not be achieved by due date.

Following previous feedback from Members, WHITE will only be used as classification when a target has actually been delivered whereas previously it was used to describe a target that had been achieved to date.

## Current Position

## Overview of Force Performance

4. Notable successes over the reporting period, in addition to those items noted in the first and second quarter reports, include:

- In December a major City of London Police operation took place across the square mile and the South East to dismantle a suspected criminal operation believed to have been selling worthless carbon credits to investors living in the UK. Detectives arrested a total of 11 suspects ( 8 in the City, 2 in Essex and 1 in Hertfordshire).
- During December a City of London Police investigation led to the UK's first criminal convictions and prison sentences (seven and six
year terms) for land banking fraud. A pair was sentenced for masterminding a three million pound deception conning the elderly and vulnerable into buying plots of land that were worthless or massively over-priced.
- Following a thorough investigation by the force's major investigation team, a man who stabbed a fellow club-goer outside a City nightclub was jailed for six years having previously pleaded guilty to the attack.
- An Economic Crime Directorate investigation resulted in an investment banker being jailed for seven years having been convicted of recklessly and illegally gambling away more than $\$ 2$ billion through fraudulent trading.
- In November a woman believed to be Britain's most prolific female fraudster who conned banks out of $£ 13$ million was jailed for nine years following a fraud investigation.
- In October the Dedicated Cheque and Plastic Crime unit (DCPCU) dismantled what is believed to be one of the UK's biggest counterfeit cheque crime groups following a major operation in Yorkshire and Scotland, this operation targeted a suspected $£ 10$ million counterfeit gang.
- In December a City night-club had it's licence revoked by the Licensing Committee following a number of serious incidents and assaults. This has already had a positive impact upon violent offences.
- In November a stranger Rape was reported in the area of St Pauls. Following a highly professional victim-focussed investigation, a suspect was swiftly arrested and charged with the offence. On $24^{\text {th }}$ January the suspect pleaded guilty to the offence and will be sentenced in March, where he has been warned that he will receive a substantial custodial sentence.


## Target Performance

5. At the end December 2012, of the 18 policing plan targets, 1 had been achieved and is now closed, (WHITE), 16 were on track to be met (GREEN) and 1 were graded (AMBER), slightly behind target, but with the possibility the target might still be met by the end of the year.
6. The end of December saw the majority of targets either being met or on track to be met; all relevant details are contained in the Appendix to this report. Only those targets recorded as AMBER or RED are discussed within the body of this report, as follows:
7. Reduce levels of victim based violent crime compared to 2011-12. At the end of the third quarter the Force is just over the year to date target (31. Since September the variance against target has increased indicating that a crime reduction by the end of March 2013 is becoming more challenging. 57 crimes were recorded in December, one more than the same month last year.
8. Uniformed Policing Directorate continues to work to target Violent Crimes taking place around licensed premises. A multi-agency Licensing Operation took place on $21^{\text {st }}$ December 2012 involving CoLP, LFB and City of London Corporation and the LFB in particular gained enough evidence to issue enforcement notices on at least 3 premises and warrant follow up visits. A fortnightly Licensing Tactical Group is chaired by Supt Community Engagement in partnership with the Head of Environmental Health and Public Protection where prosecutions under the Licensing Act are discussed.
9. Money allocated to facilitate additional enforcement work by the Licensing Team has resulted in 3 Covert operations taking place in December which has resulted in information being passed to the Licensing Authority for possible prosecutions and some good intelligence being gained. The knowledge by licensees that covert operations were taken place has had a knock on effect with many premises tightening up on procedures.
10. Operation Blitzen ran during the Christmas period with tactical delivery based on the Christmas Problem Profile and took a blended, preventative approach with both covert and overt activity. Actions were based on 16 options from the Menu of Tactical Options and involved checks of licensed premises and the issue of Notices to Quit cards under S27 Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006. These tactics are now being adopted by Operation Vilano, which will be conducted for the remainder of Q4.
11. Persons coming into police custody were questioned as to where they had been drinking to further enhance intelligence and preventative tactics. This was particularly successful with information highlighting how many persons were visiting the City who were already intoxicated or were visiting specific venues to become intoxicated.

## Conclusion

12. As with previous quarters, the Force has ended the third quarter presenting solid performance across the entire range of policing plan targets. However, there remains considerable challenges ahead to maintain these
levels, and sustained effort will be required if the Force is to meet its targets in relation to violent crime and reducing road casualties.

## Background Papers:

- Appendix "A" Performance Summary

Contact:
Paul Adams
02076012593
paul.adams@cityoflondon.pnn.police.uk

This page is intentionally left blank

Appendix A: Performance against targets/measures in the Policing Plan 2012-15 for period $1^{\text {st }}$ April $2012-31^{\text {st }}$ December 2012.

| WHITE | Target achieved | GREEN | Performance on track <br> to achieve target by <br> due date | AMBER | Progress against target <br> is significantly behind <br> schedule, but the target <br> might still be achieved | RED | No progress on target <br> or deadline/level has <br> not been met |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |


| Protect the City of London from terrorism and extremism |  |  | Measure |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1. Traffic Light <br> threat levels |  |  |  |


| Measure |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2. By $31^{\text {st }}$ March, to have delivered a programme to improve the quality and coverage of engagement with Small and Medium Sized Enterprises. |  |
| Performance | 1. Improving quality of engagement <br> The newsletter was reviewed with consultation with corporate communications; the feedback received from the circulation of 290 businesses was incorporated into the future circulations. <br> A survey was conducted in November targeting 4000 businesses to identify how well informed they are around crime and terrorism trends/issues, what information they require, preferred method of communication and how they currently receive information. They are also being asked about the preferred method of engagement. The results will be analysed to inform the engagement strategy. <br> How do you currently receive information from the City of London Police <br> 54.68\% Community E mail, or Vocal business alert <br> How well informed do you feel about current crime trends and terrorism issues <br> $34.1 \%$ not well informed, $17 \%$ felt that they were not informed at all <br> What information would benefit you and your organisation <br> 66.9\% Contingency Planning for a terrorist attack 38.9\% Terrorism Briefing <br> What is your preferred method of receiving information from us <br> 83.6\% Electronically, 8.9\% Newsletter and 3.7\% Training Sessions <br> What is your area of business <br> 81.5\% Commercial Centres, 3.1\% Restaurants and Hotels, 3.1\% Education, 2.3\% Bars and Clubs |

## Improve the quality and coverage of engagement with Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (continued)

## 2. Improving coverage of engagement

The 3500 engagements which took place in September was ostensibly constituted of delivery of the newsletter to all the SME email addresses supplied by the City of London Corporation. (the City Corporation originally provided a list of 5000 email addresses, however c1500 of these proved to be dormant and undeliverable, hence the total of 3500).

A further newsletter was circulated in December, to the 3500 email addresses.

The next newsletter is scheduled for circulation on 31st January 2013

The result is that at the beginning of the year c290 SMEs were being engaged with, now we are engaging regularly with c3500 SMEs via our electronic newsletter.

A meeting with lan Weatherhead from the Chamber of Commerce was conducted on the $15^{\text {th }}$ November 2012 as a result the force has been asked to conduct two presentations around Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SME's) at the next two chamber meetings in 2013 dates to be confirmed.

Breakfast briefing conducted along with an input from the Economic crime unit for SME's in November 2012 there were 41 attendees very positive feedback.

Engagement has taken place with the London Chamber of Commerce. They have a list of 100 SMEs based in the City of London. Further engagement is scheduled with the Federation of Small Businesses.
3. To ensure all relevant plans for development within the City of London are subject to consultation and scrutiny by the Counter Terrorism Architectural Liaison Team

The Architectural Liaison Officer (ALO) attends the monthly City of London Corporation Planning Meeting at which all new planning applications are discussed. Additionally the ALO receives a weekly email summarising all new applications, enabling early scrutiny of applications. To the end of December a total of 29 have been received and consultation has taken place on all of them. All applications were reviewed at the earliest opportunity; there were no exceptions and all reviews take place before being presented to the Planning Committee

## Measure

Traffic Light

GREEN
4. To ensure that at least $85 \%$ of people attending Project Griffin and/or Argus seminars consider the City of London Police is prepared and capable of dealing with a terrorist or major incident
Performance

During the first quarter, an average of $97.6 \%$ of 140 attendees to events considered the Force prepared and capable of dealing with a terrorist or major incident.

During the second quarter, there was one Griffin event during July and one during September, both of which returned satisfaction levels of $96 \%$. None were held during August due to Olympics commitments.

During the third quarter there was one Griffin event during October, November and December, these events returned the following satisfaction rates: $96 \%, 95 \%$ and $90 \%$ respectively. This brings the average satisfaction rate for the year to date to $95.8 \%$.

During the second quarter, five Argus events were held during July (3 returned 100\% satisfaction, 1 recorded 95\% and 1 returned $93 \%$ ). No events were held during August. During September, there were two Argus events, one retail which had 25 attendees with a satisfaction level of $96 \%$ and one to Lloyds which had 10 attendees with a satisfaction level of $100 \%$.

During the third quarter, four Argus events were held in total. The two in October returned 100\% satisfaction and these were events for business. The two events in November returned $100 \%$ and $91 \%$ satisfaction respectively, with the first event aimed at business and the second at retail. This brings the average for the year at $96.8 \%$ satisfaction of attendees at the Argus events.


| Measure |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 6. To improve the quality of fraud alerts shared with business and public sector organisations |  |  |  |  |  |  |$\quad$ Traffic Light


| Measure |  | Traffic Light |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 7. To ensure $\mathbf{8 5 \%}$ or more people attending Fraud Academy Courses are very satisfied overall with the quality and content of the course attended |  | GREEN |
| Performance | The cumulative figure of delegates that have found the quality and content of Fraud Academy Courses to be excellent, very good or good remains at $95 \%$. The feedback forms have been using these terms to describe the level of satisfaction rather than the terms, completely Satisfied, very satisfied, fairly satisfied. Feedback forms are being completed by an average of $82 \%$ of attendees, this figure has dropped due to a low return for the December course of $41 \%$. |  |
|  | Measure | Traffic Light |
| 8. To participate in at least $95 \%$ of enforcement campaigns coordinated by the National Crime Agency's Economic Crime Operations Group |  | GREEN |
| Performance | There are currently 5 key economic crime campaign activity areas where there is active or proposed enforcement activity. ECD are participating in all areas, as detailed immediately below: <br> OP Knockout is a SOCA led operation which is the continuation of the ECD led OP Ozone: ECD remain involved in continuing enforcement activity. ECD continue to work in partnership with SOCA providing operational support when required. <br> OP Rico is an ECD led operation and now has a full establishment of resources and infrastructure: On the 10th of December the Spanish National Police, the City of London Police and the Fiscales signed a JIT with Eurojust. This is significant and the first such agreement with Spain and the UK since 2008. <br> SPIRA mapping project: Involvement from initial stage and ongoing contributions. <br> OP Proximate/Poise: The investigative strategy has been drafted and multi-agency collaboration continues. <br> OP Bloom: Intelligence gathering continues with a view to finalising the strategy to deal with pension liberation and secondary investment fraud, taking in to account the liability regarding taxation and current mass marketing crime. |  |


| Respond effectively to public disorder |  |
| :---: | :---: |
|  | Measure ${ }^{\text {a }}$ ( ${ }^{\text {a }}$ (raffic Light |
| 9. To maintain at least $95 \%$ of the number of trained and equipped officers required to meet the national requirements for public mobilisation and support the Olympic and Paralympics games |  |
| Performance | The Force is required to have available for the national mobilisation 3 Police Support Units (Public Order Trained to level I or II i.e. Shield Trained). Each consisting of 1 Inspector, 3 Sergeants, 21 Constables (including 3 drivers). All supplied with full protective equipment and in protected carriers. Mobilisation can be on a regional or national basis. $100 \%$ of requests for resources have been met. <br> Changes were made across the whole Force (in accordance with national guidance) to ensure that resources were enhanced when demand required it, that overtime and cancelled leave days were kept to a minimum and support to colleagues in the MPS. To maintain officer numbers carrying out core Police Patrolling functions during the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympics Games, changes were made to Uniform Patrol Policing where duties were temporarily changed to an eight hour day pattern. This increased the number of actual working days per officer, reducing rest days and allowed greater flexibility in policing operations during the period without the need to incur cancelled rest days and overtime. In conjunction with the major change of shift pattern for Uniformed Policing, police officers in non-operational roles, such as Learning and Development and Projects, along with Prisoner Handling and Ward teams were taken from their normal roles and placed on the shift pattern. They worked alongside the patrolling officers enhancing the numbers available for deployment and increasing flexibility. <br> Roads Policing, Support Group and the TFG also amended their shift patterns. Specialist crime re-organised their duties to provide an enhanced cover on key dates during the period when it was anticipated that there would either be a greater demand or the nature of events taking place required a speedier response. Economic Crime adapted their duties to provide support for Uniform Policing by covering the role of Prisoner Handling team throughout the period. <br> Leave during the main Olympic three-week period was restricted to only $7 \%$ of the Force, and in some areas where their role was particularly crucial no leave was allowed. During the Olympic and Paralympics period the City of London hosted a number of parallel events which were resourced by CoLP officers. There were over 50 of these types of events, 20 of which attracted significant resources of 2 PS and 12 PCs or more, these were policed from the available resources and incurred minimal cancelled leave and overtime. CoLP provided specialists officers from TFG as Personal Protection Officers, Mounted officers, Roads Policing (VIP Escort) and Dog handlers. 21 Personal Protection Officers, supplied by TFG, deployed to the MPS on Mutual Aid. They worked a total of 394 days. 9 Mounted officers worked a total of 175 days. Roads Policing supplied eight motorcycle VIP Escort Trained Officers (VIPEX) who worked a total of 96 days on mutual aid. <br> The Dog section provided nine Weapon Recovery and Explosive Dogs / handlers who worked a total of 91 days. In addition to this a latter deployment, for mutual aid, was instigated to cover the MPS policing operation around the Paralympics Committee's occupation of the Grange St. Paul's Hotel. The City of London Police were requested, and provided, 338 officer-days to this operation. The resources committed to this were two Inspectors three Sergeants and eighteen Constables per day between 27 August and 10 September 2012. During the Olympic \& Paralympic period the CoLP Community team supplied a full-time Bronze to the Cross-Sector Safety \& Security Partnerships Information Hub (CSSC). <br> Text from quarter 2 for reference as there is no change in position as this has been achieved. |

10. To ensure at least $\mathbf{8 5 \%}$ of residents and businesses are satisfied with the information received in relation to large pre-planned events

## Performance

The Following pre-planned events will be assessed within this measure: The Queens Diamond Jubilee; The Olympics \& Paralympics; The Lord Mayors Show

The Queen's Diamond Jubilee
City of London businesses and residents were surveyed to ascertain the level of satisfaction with Force communications relating to the Queen's Diamond Jubilee (QDJ) arrangements. Marketing company Vocal Ltd of Colchester was commissioned to distribute the surveys and compile the results. Vocal used Survey Monkey and distributed the surveys to CoLP Business and Residents email group addresses on $18^{\text {th }}$ June.

- $\quad 37$ responses were received from residents, with 34 completing the overall satisfaction question.
- 181 responses were received from the business community, with 163 completing the overall satisfaction question.
- $\quad \mathbf{9 5 . 1 \%}$ (155 out of 163 ) of Business Community respondents answered very satisfied or satisfied to the question: "Overall, how satisfied were you with the information we sent you about the Queen's Diamond Jubilee celebrations?"
- $\quad \mathbf{9 1 . 2 \%}$ (31 out of 34) of Resident respondents answered very satisfied or satisfied to the same question.


## 2012 Olympic \& Paralympic Games

iModus surveyed City of London Businesses and Residents in respect of the CoLP provision of information in relation to the 2012 Olympic \& Paralympic Games. This survey was conducted during September 2012.

- 100 responses were received from the business community
- 25 responses were received from residents.
- Satisfaction levels for business respondents (100 returned) were $96 \%$ which included $54 \%$ very satisfied with the information provided.
- Satisfaction levels for residents ( 25 returned) were $\mathbf{9 0 \%}$ including $60 \%$ very satisfied.

Of the respondents, $83 \%$ of the business respondents and $64 \%$ of the resident respondents located in the City of London.
Overall, people were happy with the information provided and level of content and contact.
The Force is still awaiting data/feedback from Lord Mayor's Show, data from this event will be included once available.

Reduce the levels of violent crime and theft

| Measure |  | Traffic Light |
| :--- | :--- | :---: |
| 11. To reduce levels of victim based violent crime compared to 2011-12 |  | AMMBER |
| Performance | April - December 2012: 457 offences recorded (April - December 2011: 420) <br> At the end of December the force is 31 above target. Since September the variance against target has increased indicating that a crime <br> reduction by the end of March 2013 is becoming more challenging. 57 crimes were recorded in December, one more than the same <br> month last year. |  |
| The monthly trend indicates that it may prove difficult to achieve any crime reductions in January. Last year 47 offences were recorded <br> which was low compared to the surrounding months and the January's average for the previous 3 years (56). There may be some <br> limited opportunity for crime reduction in February and possibly March. |  |  |



An average of 37 crimes can be recorded per month to achieve an end of year crime reduction. This level has not been achieved in the forthcoming months for the last 4 years. The Jan - Mar average over the last 4 years is 52. If this average continues the end of March figure will be 613, an increase of $7.7 \%(+44)$


Trends based on between 6 months and 2 years data indicate that the force will end the year above target at between 618 and 640 offences.

## To reduce levels of victim based violent crime compared to 2011-12 (continued)

Violence with Injury: 31 more crimes have been recorded this financial year compared to last. This is due to a YTD increase in Assault with Injury (+19) with 189 offences recorded compared to 170 last year. Assault with Injury began increasing in November (30) and has continued into December (35) compared with a monthly average of 19 for the rest of the year. 3 racially aggravated assaults were recorded in December, 2 were linked to night time economy (taxi related) and 1 to retail.

Violence without Injury: 1 fewer crime has been recorded in this financial year compared to last, an improved position compared to both October $(+22)$ and November (+16). This is due to a low number of common assaults being recorded in December (14) compared to the same month last year (29). Common assault has subsequently fallen by 6 YTD from 163 last year to 157 this year. The biggest increase in this category is in Assault on PC. This has increased from 15 offences last year to 22 this year ( +7 ), however no further offences were recorded in December.

Sexual Offences, which account for $7.2 \%$ of the total victim based violent crime, have increased from 26 last year to 33 this year (+7). 6 rapes have been recorded compared to 1 last year, 2 of these have been detected. Of the four undetected rapes the suspect is known in 3 cases. Sexual assaults have increased by 1 as have exposure offences.

Crime Squad officers were deployed on Op Blitzen - "to make dynamic assessments concerning violence, disorder and potential licensing breaches to assist the directing of the uniformed response and licensing visits conducted by them". They were also deployed on Op Port - illegal taxi touting operation; research suggests there is a link between unlicensed cabs and sexual offences.

Crime Assistance Vehicle (CAV) car continues to operate Weds to Sat night and has responsibility to attend all crimes scenes relating to violent offences. All violent offences are investigated by officers from the CID office who in turn liaise with Licensing where applicable.

Approval has been given for $£ 20 \mathrm{k}$ to facilitate additional enforcement work by the Licensing Team. They will look to prosecute licensees who serve alcohol to those patrons who are already intoxicated.

Money allocated to facilitate additional enforcement work by the Licensing Team has resulted in 3 Covert operations taking place in December which has resulted in information being passed to the Licensing Authority for possible prosecutions and some good intelligence being gained. The knowledge by licensees that covert operations were taken place has had a knock on effect with many premises tightening up on procedures.

Support Group continue to be tasked on Friday and Saturday nights with visiting the top Ten Licensed Premises linked to disorder; Top Ten and Top Twenty Licensed Premises have also been subject to dedicated extra patrols


## To reduce levels of victim based theft compared to 2011-12 (continued)

Theft from Person has been monitored over the last few months due to increasing trends in the surrounding MPS Boroughs. Although levels increased in October (39) and November (30), only 17 offences were recorded in December compared to an average of 26 for the previous 12 months. As the trends still appear to be increasing in the surround MPS boroughs this will continue to be monitored.

Burglary Non Dwelling continues to increase with 281 offences recorded compared to 211 last year (+70). 32 crimes were recorded in December 2012 compared to 11 in December 2011. This is the highest number since a peak in the summer (50). It is anticipated that there will be a financial year increase in this category although it should not affect the overall acquisitive crime reduction target.

Theft Other currently accounts for $49.6 \%$ of the total victim based acquisitive crime. Although the YTD increase is only 2 more crimes than last year, it is a different position to the 36 fewer reported last month. 159 crimes were recorded in December compared to 131 the same month last year. During December Theft Other most frequently occurred on a Friday evening (large proportion in Licensed Premises) however there was a relatively low number committed between December $24^{\text {th }}$ and $31^{\text {st }}$. Theft Other has been showing some increase over the last quarter.

Theft from Licensed Premises continues to increase in December with 107 offences recorded. This number of offences recorded has been increasing each month for four months making the YTD total 733 compared to 606 , a $21.0 \%(+127)$ increase compared to last year.

CID teams given specific SPOC responsibilities in order to target offenders engaged in burglaries/gym thefts/robberies/motor vehicle crime. Operation Star continues to run; plain clothes officers are deployed to cafes/licensed premises and restaurants; use of decoy handbag or mobile phone used. Early intervention tactics undertaken to avoid commission of a victim based acquisitive offence; Crime Prevention Officer tasked with visiting top 20 problem premises for theft to offer advice and surveys. Operation Spinetail continue to investigate offences relating to cafes, restaurants and licensed premises.

Burglary SPOC now has access to PINS and monitors movements of top $25 \times$ offenders. Once release date is confirmed, a visit is arranged to discourage reoffending. Daily Burglary Briefing in operation to notify officers on division of potential offenders or known offenders being released from prison


## To reduce the number of collisions resulting in injury compared to 2011－12（continued）

December 2012 there are 20 casualties（ 5 Serious and 15 Slight）recorded on CRS as a result of 20 reported collisions which is less than the 24 reported collisions and 32 casualties recorded in 2011 and similar to the 20 reported collisions and 21 casualties in 2010.

CRS does not have the Pedestrian Fatal that occurred on Friday 21st recorded
Recorded Pedestrian Casualties at 2 （both Serious）in December 2012，is below the average of 9 （ 7 Slight in 2011， 1 Serious and 5 Slight in 2010， and 1 Serious and 14 Slight in 2009）for the previous 3 years

Cyclist casualties at 9 （2 Serious and 7 Slight）are above the average of just over 7 （1 Serious and 8 Slight in 2011， 3 Serious and 3 Slight in 2010， and 7 Slight in 2009）for the previous 3 years．

Motorcyclists casualties at 7 （all Slight）is above the average of 4 （4 Slight in 2011， 3 Slight in 2010，and 5 Slight in 2009）for the previous 3 years．

| Measure |  |  |  |  |  |  | Traffic Light |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 14. To increase the number of uninsured vehicles seized compared to 2011-12 |  |  |  |  |  |  | GREEN |
| Performance | Baseline insurance seizures 2011/12: 333 ( 253 for no insurance and 80 for no insurance AND no driving licence), monthly average 27.75 <br> The total of uninsured vehicles to date is 298 against a profile of 249. <br> Finance Profile $=£ 52,515$ with an actual of $£ 74,123$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Month | No Insurance | Ins \& No D/L | Total | 2012 Total | 2011 Total = Target |  |
|  | April | 13 | 10 | 23 | 23 | 28 |  |
|  | May | 24 | 2 | 26 | 49 | 55 |  |
|  | June | 21 | 6 | 27 | 76 | 83 |  |
|  | July | 24 | 9 | 33 | 109 | 111 |  |
|  | August | 30 | 10 | 40 | 149 | 139 |  |
|  | September | 41 | 14 | 55 | 204 | 166 |  |
|  | October | 16 | 8 | 24 | 228 | 194 |  |
|  | November | 30 | 4 | 34 | 262 | 222 |  |
|  | December | 26 | 10 | 36 | 298 | 249 |  |
|  | January |  |  |  |  | 277 |  |
|  | February |  |  |  |  | 304 |  |
|  | March |  |  |  |  | 333 |  |
|  | There were a total of 46 vehicles seized in December. In addition to the figures above there were a further 7 seized for No D/L and 3 "other". Of the 46, 20 were seized as a direct result of ANPR activation. |  |  |  |  |  |  |



16．To ensure at least $85 \%$ or more crime victims and those reporting antisocial behaviour satisfied with the way police handled their case（whole experience）

## Baseline Figures for whole of 2011／12：

Performance
People reporting Antisocial Behaviour（ASB）：92．3\％satisfied
Victims of Crime（VoC）：88\％satisfied
Q1：
Victims of crime： $87.9 \%$ satisfied． 153 out of 174 respondents expressed satisfaction with the service received．
People reporting ASB： $94 \%$ satisfied． 47 out of 50 respondents expressed satisfaction with the service received．

## Q2：

Victims of crime： $87.4 \%$ satisfied． 152 out of 174.
People reporting ASB： $90 \%$ satisfied． 36 out of 40 ．

## Q3：

Victims of Crime $81.4 \%$ satisfied． 136 out of 167.
People reporting ASB： $95.2 \%$ satisfied． 40 out of 42 ．
Satisfaction with Whole Experience for VoC has fallen each quarter since Q4 of 2011／12（90．4\％）to $81.4 \%$ ．The number of people expressing dissatisfaction with the overall service provided has risen from $5 \%$（ 9 people）to $11 \%$（ 18 people）．Initial findings suggest the main source of dissatisfaction is with Actions Taken（ $79 \%$ satisfaction， 22 people dissatisfied），Investigation（ $74 \%$ satisfaction， 26 people dissatisfied），and Follow Up（ $81 \%$ satisfaction， 17 people dissatisfied）． 5 people answered that they felt discriminated against－one of these was on the grounds of race．A full report will be presented to February＇s PMG．

ASB has regained a high satisfaction rate at 95．2\％．
At the end of Q3 both VoC and ASB remain above the $85 \%$ target，but Q4 will require at least $82 \%$ satisfaction for VOC if the $85 \%$ end of year target is to be achieved．

| Measure |  | Traffic Light |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 17. To ensure at least $80 \%$ of City street population surveyed who expressed a view consider the police in the City of London are doing a good or excellent job |  | GREEN |
| Performance | Q1: $90.4 \%$ ( 150 out of 166 ) respondents to the survey expressed the view that the police were doing a good or excellent job. Q2: $93.1 \%$ (149 out of 160 ) respondents to the survey expressed the view that the police were doing a good or excellent job. Data for quarter 3 has not yet been analysed. |  |
|  | Measure | Traffic Light |
| 18. To respond to at least $95 \%$ of 999 calls within 12 minutes |  | GREEN |
| Performance | 1365 out of 1401 ( $97.4 \%$ ) incidents in the City between April and December and graded for immediate response were attended within 12 minutes. The response rate for December was $97.2 \%$ ( 140 out of 144 incidents). Over the last 12 months the Force has consistently achieved this target. |  |



## Agenda Item 6

| Committee(s): <br> Police Performance and Resource <br> Management Sub-Committee | Date(s): <br> $8^{\text {th }}$ February 2013 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Subject: <br> Policing Plan Targets for 2013-14 | Public |
| Report of: <br> Commissioner of Police <br> POL 10/13 | For Information |

## Summary

1. This report presents for Members' information those Policing Plan targets adopted for 2013-14. The measures were agreed by Members at the Policing Plan workshop meeting on $18^{\text {th }}$ January 2013 subject to some minor amendments, all of which have been incorporated within the final measures.
2. Attached at Appendix 'A' is a document that provides an overview of each target, and which includes the rationale for its adoption, baseline performance information against which levels have been set and how it will be reported.
3. The measures agreed by Members are:

CT Measure 1- To increase the number of engagements with the community aimed at deterring people supporting terrorism or violent extremism (new measure)

CT measure 2 - To ensure all relevant plans for business development within the City of London are subject to consultation and scrutiny by the Counter Terrorism Architectural Liaison team (existing measure)

CT Measure 3- To deploy intelligence led, high visibility policing operations to counter the terrorism threat and to reassure the public (new measure)

CT Measure 4 -To ensure that at least $90 \%$ of people surveyed consider the City of London Police is prepared and capable of policing the terrorist threat effectively (new measure)

EC Measure 1-To increase the number of government and industry sectors providing economic crime data to the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (new measure)

EC Measure 2 -To increase quantity and quality of fraud prevention products disseminated by the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (new measure)

EC Measure 3- To disrupt the top 10 organised crime groups causing the greatest harm (amended existing measure)

EC Measure 4 -To ensure that at least $90 \%$ of fraud victims are satisfied with the service provided (new measure)

EC Measure 5- To increase by $10 \%$ the number of police officers, public sector and private sector fraud investigators trained by the Fraud Academy (new measure)
EC Measure 6-To conduct reviews of investigations, to inform Fraud Academy training courses and best practice toolkits (new measure)

PO Measure 1- To meet all national requirements for public order mobilisation in support of the Strategic Policing Requirement (new measure)

PO Measure 2- To deliver ongoing organisational improvements and development relating to public order deployments (new measure)

PO Measure 3 - To ensure at that least $85 \%$ of residents and businesses are satisfied with the information received in relation to pre-planned events (amended existing measure)
CR Measure 1- To reduce levels of victim-based violent crime compared to 2012-13 (existing measure - year change only)

CR Measure 2- To reduce levels of victim-based acquisitive crime compared to 2012-13 (existing measure - year change only)

RP Measure 1- To support the City of London Corporation's casualty reduction target through enforcement and education activities (new measure)

RP Measure 2- To increase the number of uninsured vehicles seized and unlicensed drivers apprehended compared to 2012-13 (amended existing measure)

RP Measure 3 - To increase the number of referrals to the Safer Cycle Scheme and the Driver Alert Scheme compared to 2012-13 (amended existing measure)

ASB Measure 1- To ensure that at least $90 \%$ of those reporting antisocial behaviour are satisfied with the way the police handled their case (amended existing measure)
ASB Measure 2- To reduce the average annual number of rough sleepers in the City of London (new measure)

ASB Measure 3- To actively promote, with partners, effective stewardship and crime prevention activities within licensed premises (new measure)
ASB Measure 4 - To run intelligence led operations to target threats associated with the night time economy (new measure)

Satisfaction Measure - To ensure at least $85 \%$ of the City's street population surveyed consider the police in the City of London are doing a good or excellent job (amended existing measure)

Response Measure - To respond to at least $95 \%$ of 999 calls within the national target time of 12 minutes (amended existing measure)

## Recommendation

It is recommended that your Sub Committee receives this report and notes its contents.

## Main Report

## Background

1. This report presents for Members' information those policing plan measures and targets adopted for 2013-14. Performance against the targets will be reported quarterly to your Performance and Resource Management Sub-Committee.
2. Work on reviewing the targets started in October 2012 through a series of meetings held with Directorate Heads and chaired by the Assistant Commissioner and the Commander. The initial review involved:

- assessing the extent to which the current Policing Plan targets could be carried forward on the basis that they remained relevant to the delivery of the emerging policing plan priorities;
- if measures were to be carried forward, the extent to which they remained suitably challenging to drive performance in a particular area; and
- exploring options for completely new targets where necessary.

3. Subsequent meetings concentrated on refining the measures and ensuring there was a robust rationale for adopting a particular measure and that it could be measured adequately and reported against.

## Current situation

4. The document appended to this report at Appendix ' $A$ ' provides Members with an overview of each target that includes the rationale for its adoption, baseline performance information against which levels have been set and how it will be reported.
5. The measures were agreed by Members at the second Policing Plan workshop meeting held on $18^{\text {th }}$ January 2013, subject to some minor amendments being made to EC Measure 6, ASB Measure 4 and the two measures supporting satisfaction and response. Those amendments have been made and are reflected in the document appended to this report.
6. The measures will form part of the Policing Plan that will be submitted for final approval to your Grand Committee on $15^{\text {th }}$ February 2013.

## Recommendation

7. It is recommended that your Sub Committee receives this report and notes its contents

## Background Papers:

- Appendix "A" Policing Plan Measures and Targets 2013: Rationale and background information for measures

Contact:<br>Stuart Phoenix<br>Head of Strategic Planning<br>02076012213<br>Stuart.phoenix@cityoflondon.pnn.police.uk

## Policing Plan Targets and Measures

Rationale and background information
for measures

## INTRODUCTION

This document proposes measures that have been developed to support delivery of the Policing Plan 2013-16. It provides the rationale for the priorities and the supporting measures which appear in the plan.

A summary of the proposed measures appears immediately below. Each measure is then presented in more detail, along with current (and past where available) performance information. The priorities and measures follow the same order as they appear in the policing plan.

## Summary of Measures

## Protect the City of London from terrorism and extremism

CT Measure 1- To increase the number of engagements with the community aimed at deterring people supporting terrorism or violent extremism

CT measure 2 - To ensure all relevant plans for business development within the City of London are subject to consultation and scrutiny by the Counter Terrorism Architectural Liaison team

CT Measure 3- To deploy intelligence led, high visibility policing operations to counter the terrorism threat and to reassure the public

CT Measure 4 -To ensure that at least $90 \%$ of people surveyed consider the City of London Police is prepared and capable of policing the terrorist threat effectively

Protect the City of London and UK from fraud

EC Measure 1-To increase the number of government and industry sectors providing economic crime data to the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau

EC Measure 2 -To increase quantity and quality of fraud prevention products disseminated by the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau

EC Measure 3- To disrupt the top 10 organised crime groups causing the greatest harm.
EC Measure 4 -To ensure that at least $90 \%$ of fraud victims are satisfied with the service provided
EC Measure 5- To increase by $10 \%$ the number of police officers, public sector and private sector fraud investigators trained by the Fraud Academy.

EC Measure 6-To conduct reviews of investigations, to inform Fraud Academy training courses and best practice toolkits.

## Respond effectively to public disorder

PO Measure 1- To meet all national requirements for public order mobilisation in support of the Strategic Policing Requirement

PO Measure 2- To deliver ongoing organisational improvements and development relating to public order deployments

PO Measure 3 - To ensure at that least $85 \%$ of residents and businesses are satisfied with the information received in relation to pre-planned events

## Reducing crime

CR Measure 1- To reduce levels of victim-based violent crime compared to 2012-13
CR Measure 2- To reduce levels of victim-based acquisitive crime compared to 2012-13

## Improve road safety

RP Measure 1- To support the City of London Corporation's casualty reduction target through enforcement and education activities

RP Measure 2- To increase the number of uninsured vehicles seized and unlicensed drivers apprehended compared to 2012-13

RP Measure 3 - To increase the number of referrals to the Safer Cycle Scheme and the Driver Alert Scheme compared to 2012-13

## Antisocial Behaviour

ASB Measure 1- To ensure that at least $90 \%$ of those reporting antisocial behaviour are satisfied with the way the police handled their case.

ASB Measure 2- To reduce the average annual number of rough sleepers in the City of London
ASB Measure 3- To actively promote, with partners, effective stewardship and crime prevention activities within licensed premises

ASB Measure 4 - To run intelligence led operations to target threats associated with the night time economy

## Satisfaction and Response

To ensure at least $85 \%$ of the City's street population surveyed consider the police in the City of London are doing a good or excellent job

To respond to at least $95 \%$ of 999 calls within the national target time of 12 minutes

## Priority - Counter Terrorism

Reason for priority
1.1 The Strategic Assessment (SA) notes that although whilst the threat from international terrorism appears to have reduced, as with the threat from domestic extremism, the City of London remains a primary target from both Irish and international terrorism. This is principally due to its reputation as one of the world's foremost financial hubs and its importance nationally and globally in financial and cultural terms. The threat level for the UK remains at Substantial (having reduced from Severe in July 2011), indicating there remains a strong possibility of an attack.
1.2 The central message from the SA is that the threat from terrorism in an environment like the City is such that the protection of the City has to remain one of the Force's principal priorities. It also ensures that the Force is addressing its obligations in this area to support the Strategic Policing Requirement.
1.3 Last year, the principal CT measure centred on maintaining "Ring of Steel" patrols at a level commensurate with threat levels. That target has not been continued for 2013 onwards, although the information will still be collated, monitored and reported to PMG. A commitment to the Ring of Steel will be articulated within the text of the policing plan. The measures that are proposed do, however, cover the breadth of CT activities and focus on the Prevent Strategy, the future proofing the City against attack, the business community and the wider community's confidence that the Force is prepared and capable of dealing effectively with a terrorist or major incident.

CT Measure 1 - To increase the number of engagements with the community aimed at deterring people supporting terrorism or violent extremism
1.4 Reason: Prevent is a key pillar of the Government's Counter Terrorism strategy (Contest). It seeks to highlight those people who are vulnerable to or are on the path towards violent extremism. Through national Prevent arrangements a referral process is in place to provide assistance to such people. A Prevent engagement is defined nationally as an interaction with individuals, groups or institutions where the Prevent agenda is specifically briefed or discussed. Examples of engagements include: - a Prevent stand at university Freshers' week highlighting the Prevent agenda; presentations to youth clubs regarding Prevent; interaction with company HR and IT departments about Prevent and methods of reporting suspicious behaviour.
1.5 Baseline Information: CoLP delivered 49 events that fulfilled the criteria for Prevent engagements during 2012 (1st January to 29th November 2012). These involved residential, business and student communities. A target of 4 engagements per month represents a challenging increase on last year's performance but is realistic as our Prevent capability and network of engagement increases. No data was recorded prior to 2012.
1.6 How it will be measured/reported: All engagements are reported to the Prevent coordinator. These are recorded and reported to the National Prevent Delivery Unit (NPDU) on a quarterly basis. Engagements are undertaken by Prevent staff within SB and also designated staff within Wards policing. Data will be supplied monthly to PMG by the CT department.

CT Measure 2 - To ensure all relevant plans for business development within the City of London are subject to consultation and scrutiny by the Counter Terrorism Architectural Liaison team
1.7 Reason: This measure is carried forward from 2012-13. It supports a key area of prevention work in counter terrorism. The term 'design out crime and terrorism' is a well recognised one that is used by the Force and its partners and is generally well understood. 'Designing out' vulnerabilities from terrorism, extremism and crime are part of CT's core business and reflect the responsibilities of the Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSA) and the Architectural Liaison Officer (ALO) team. It assists in future proofing the City against attack. An additional element is being introduced, which is to develop a mechanism for assessing the impact of the feedback provided by the Force. That information will be collated over the course of the year with a view to setting a target based on quality/satisfaction at the next target review.
1.8 The word relevant is included to reflect the fact that the Barbican, for example, is a Grade 2 listed building and minor structural and cosmetic changes require the submission of a plan. The Force would not comment on these in the normal course of business. However, criteria are formally established confirming that the Force will scrutinise all development plans for new builds and major refurbishments.
1.9 "Relevant" applications that are referred for ALO consultation are:

- Office and commercial developments
- Housing developments
- Major retail and leisure developments (not individual units within existing premises)
- Public open space or landscaping
- Other developments as from time to time agreed between the Planning Department and the ALO
1.10 Baseline Information: The City of London Corporation's Planning Department identifies relevant applications and the ALO reviews each one. During 2011 (current year's data is overleaf) it reviewed all 46 relevant applications. Many of these are lengthy and can result in planning conditions being proposed through formal statements by the ALO. It is a complex, multi stakeholder process, not merely a paper review.


## Current position (Financial year to date)

| Month | April | May | June | July | Aug | Sept | Oct |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| YTD Total <br> consultation <br> given | 4 | 7 | 11 | 15 | 19 | 22 | 23 |
| Traffic Light | Green | Green | Green | Green | Green | Green | Green |
| Development <br> Plans <br> submitted <br> within month | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 1 |
| Reviewed <br> Plans (no <br> advice | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| required) | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |  |
| Reviewed <br> Plans (written <br> advice | 4 | 3 | 4 | $\longrightarrow$ | 4 | 4 | $\longrightarrow$ |
| provided) | $\longrightarrow$ | 4 | 4 | $\longrightarrow$ |  |  |  |
| Trend | $\longrightarrow$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |

1.11 How it will be measured: the table above illustrates how the information will be reported to PMG. Data will be supplied monthly by CT.

CT measure 3 - To deploy intelligence led, high visibility policing operations to counter the terrorism threat and to reassure the public
1.12 Reason: The Government's Counter Terrorism strategy, 'CONTEST', tackles the terrorist threat through various strands, the 'Protect' element strengthening our protection against terrorist attacks in the UK and reducing vulnerability. The Threat level remains at Substantial, indicating a strong possibility of an attack and the Force Strategic Assessment demonstrates that the City of London still remains a primary target from both Irish and International terrorism. The unique environment of the City and its high concentration of critical and iconic sites makes it an attractive target for terrorists and the nature of the threat is diversifying, often in response to events across the world. Our continued intelligence led approach to daily high visibility policing deployments is key to protecting the City of London. City of London Police will continue to work with our partners to assess the level and nature of threat posed and will analyse the results of our tactical deployments and resultant intelligence. Key activity will continue to be taken in relation to intelligence and enforcement and this particular protective activity aims to detect, deter and disrupt those individuals, who may be motivated by extreme ideologies, intent on causing harm to others.
1.13 Historically the Force has used a six weekly Counter Terrorism tasking and coordination process which has considered the most recent Intelligence and information to inform the timing, location and nature of the tactics to be deployed. Intelligence from partner agencies, analysis of Operation Lightning (Hostile Reconnaissance) reports, forthcoming evenst and the overall level and nature of the
terrorist threat are among the factors considered in determining the policing response to mitigate the threat. Tactics include a broad range of options including;

- Control Room activity utilising the CCTV and Automatic Number Plate Recognition technology around the City in order to identify any suspicious behaviour and coordinate an appropriate and proportionate policing response.
- Directed Patrols, both armed and unarmed, and in vehicles and on foot, focused around iconic, vulnerable, and critical sites.
- 'Entry Point' Policing, targeting vehicles entering the City of London through the 'Ring of Steel',
- Uniformed patrols, delivering Ct patrols directed to specific locations including crowded places
1.14 All staff and officers employed in these bespoke Counter Terrorism tactics are briefed in advance regarding the current threat picture and intelligence and the tactical delivery of these options is reviewed daily through the Daily Management Meeting and can be refined in response to new intelligence or local incidents.
1.15 2013 sees the introduction of a more holistic approach to tasking and coordination within the City of London police and Counter Terrorism taskings will be considered as part of a single Force process as opposed having a separate mechanism. This will allow a more effective use of resources and the governance of the Daily Management Meeting will remain and will allow tactics to be revised in response to any emerging intelligence or information.
1.16 The use of specially trained Behavioural Detection Officers as part of a bespoke high visibility policing deployment is a new concept being introduced by the City of London Police. These tactics are designed to identify suspicious behaviour by creating an environment (that raises the anxieties of those worried about being detected because they are criminals or have criminal intent. Behavioural Detection Officers (BDOs) are trained to firstly establish what is normal for their environment and then look for deviations from this baseline.
1.17 Training also includes an emphasis on specific behaviours often displayed by attackers; those engaged in hostile reconnaissance and general suspicious behaviour indicators. Finally, it addresses a new approach to resolving concerns about identified individuals through a rapport-based elicitation of information. The Force has recently carried out a three-week trial of BDO activity and it is anticipated that this will form part of business as usual from next year.
1.18 This new approach involves a more effective and strategic co-ordination of existing CoLP resources to deter and detect hostile reconnaissance. This tactic aims to not only deter the selection of the City as a terrorist target, but also result in a reduction in wider crime and allows for a more flexible and variable approach.

Baseline Information: The current minimum level of dedicated, Counter Terrorism deployments comprises eight Entry Points policed three times each throughout the day, dedicated high visibility patrols in specific geographical areas including iconic and critical sites as well as the vicinity of rail stations and crowded /night time economy venues.
1.20 The Force Tactical Firearms Group is required to deliver at least $90 \%$ of its deployment time on a combination of armed vehicle and foot patrols and CCTV/ANPR operators within the Force Command \& Control Centre also have a commitment to counter terrorism. These deployments are recorded on the Force Sharepoint system, as are the numbers of intelligence reports generated, the number of people and vehicles stopped, searched and the outcome of these interactions.
1.21 The use of BDO operations has been found to produce a higher success rate than traditional policing methods. Various studies, carried out in London with both police and civilian screening staff, consistently show that about $25 \%$ of BDO stops lead to an outcome such as an arrest or caution. Traditional methods typically generate less than 5\% positive outcomes. During the three week trial of BDO operations within the City of London during December 2012 a success rate of around $25 \%$ was achieved and this figure is proposed as a target for BDO operations.
1.22 How it will be measured/ reported: The number and nature of deployments will be reported monthly to PMG and measured against the minimum number of operations tasked. UPD will continue to record the level of high visibility CT specific policing activity on Sharepoint .
1.23 Early indications are that the BDO trial has shown significant successes and is likely to be recommended as being adopted as a regular uniformed policing tactic. The measure of successful outcomes against the $25 \%$ target represents a qualitative measure that has, until now, been absent.
1.24 The BDO trial included a comprehensive corporate communications package and the capture of feedback from members of the public. These showed that the majority of people who were asked found the tactic reassuring. It is proposed that future similar surveys will be carried out and the use of trained tactical engagement officers on these operations will proactively seek feedback from the public. Corporate Communications department will conduct periodic media campaigns and feedback will be collated.
1.25 All of the above will be coordinated under the direction of Supt UPD, responsible for the tactical delivery. All related intelligence reports will be assessed by Special Branch / Counter Terrorism Section to ensure compliance with local and national CT Operations (Operation Lightning, hostile reconnaissance; Operation Trammel, use of forged/false documents to facilitate terrorism, and Operation Camion, the terrorist use of liveried vehicles). All intelligence gained will be assessed and appropriately investigated. The Supt CT will coordinate the latter and both areas
will report to PMG and will also be subject of a higher-level quarterly report to Police Committee.

CT measure 4 - To ensure that at least $90 \%$ of people surveyed consider the City of London Police is prepared and capable of policing the terrorist threat effectively
1.26 Reason: For 2012-13 the Force adopted a similar target, which focused on attendees at Griffin ${ }^{1}$ and Argus ${ }^{2}$ events. The Force performed well against that target, and it is proposed to continue with a qualitative measure that focuses on a broader audience. Both Argus and Griffin are key elements of the Force's overall aim to reduce the risk from terrorism. Feedback from both events is crucial to improving how the Force performs in this area and consequently how confident the City's community is in the Force's ability to deal with a terrorist or major incident.
1.27 To be able to gauge the extent to which the Force is succeeding in demonstrating its preparedness to deal with a terrorist incident, it is proposed to introduce a new target that assesses confidence in the wider community and not just those who have received an Argus or Griffin briefing or have just attended a specific event. This measure will highlight what work needs to be done to ensure that the community feels reassured that the Force is capable and prepared to deal with the threat from terrorism
1.28 Baseline Information: Baseline 2011-12: There were on average 12 Griffin events per year, although for 2012-13 this was reduced to 8 due to Olympic and Paralympic Games commitments. Argus events usually averaged around 30 per year. With regard to Griffin events, over the course of 2011-12, the Force recorded an average level of $97 \%$ of people expressing confidence in the City of London Police's capability to deal effectively with a terrorist or major incident. Last year's target was of $85 \%$ of delegates confident in the Force's ability to deal with a terrorist or major incident due to the inclusion of Argus events in the measure, which had not previously been benchmarked and its impact on Griffin performance had not been assessed at that time. $90 \%$ is therefore considered to incorporate an element of stretch.

[^16]ARGUS BASELINE INFORMATION

| Month | April | May | June | July | Aug | Sept | Oct | Nov |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Month <br> Achievement | No <br> data | No <br> data | $93 \%$ | $97.6 \%$ | - | $98 \%$ | $100 \%$ | $95.5 \%$ |
| Traffic Light | - | - | Green | Green | - | Green | Green | Green |
| \# Argus Seminars | 3 | 2 | 7 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Percentage <br> Change | - | - | N/A | $4.6 \%$ | - | $0.4 \%$ | $2 \%$ | $-4.5 \%$ |
| Trend | - | - | N/A | 4 | - | 4 | $\uparrow$ | $\downarrow$ |
| YTD Average | - | - | $93 \%$ | $95.3 \%$ | - | $96.2 \%$ | $97.15 \%$ | $96.82 \%$ |

## GRIFFIN BASELINE INFORMATION

| Month | April | May | June | July | Aug | Sept | Oct | Nov |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Month <br> Achievement | $99 \%$ | $99 \%$ | - | $96 \%$ | - | - | $96 \%$ | $95 \%$ |
| Traffic Light | Green | Green | Green | Green | - | - | Green | Green |
| \# Griffin Seminars | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Percentage <br> Change | N/A | 0 | - | $-3 \%$ | - | - | 0 | $-1 \%$ |
| Trend | N/A | $\longrightarrow$ | - | $\nabla$ | - | - | $\longrightarrow$ | $\downarrow$ |
| YTD Average | $99 \%$ | $99 \%$ | - | $98 \%$ | - | - | $97.5 \%$ | $97 \%$ |

BASELINE INFORMATION, GENERAL SURVEY RESULTS: Data supplied by PIU.

On a scale of $\mathbf{0}$ to $\mathbf{1 0}$ (where $\mathbf{0}$ is not at all confident and 10 is completely confident), how confident are you that City of London Police can effectively police Counter Terrorism?

| Rating | Q3 2011/12 | Q4 2011/12 | Q1 2012/13 | Q2 2012/13 | Total | Percentage |
| ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{0}$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $0.0 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{1}$ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $0.0 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{2}$ | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | $0.3 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{3}$ | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | $0.3 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{4}$ | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 3 | $0.5 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{5}$ | 12 | 4 | 7 | 5 | 28 | $4.7 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{6}$ | 8 | 18 | 4 | 7 | 37 | $6.2 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{7}$ | 22 | 22 | 17 | 13 | 74 | $12.3 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{8}$ | 45 | 50 | 70 | 52 | 217 | $36.2 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{9}$ | 31 | 22 | 39 | 49 | 141 | $23.5 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{1 0}$ | 21 | 32 | 21 | 22 | 96 | $16.0 \%$ |
| Total | $\mathbf{1 4 1}$ | $\mathbf{1 4 9}$ | $\mathbf{1 6 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 5 0}$ | $\mathbf{6 0 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 . 0 \%}$ |


| $7+$ | $84 \%$ | $85 \%$ | $92 \%$ | $91 \%$ | $88 \%$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $8+$ | $69 \%$ | $70 \%$ | $81 \%$ | $82 \%$ | $76 \%$ |

1.29 The above table shows the current percentages of people's levels of confidence that the Force can effectively police counter terrorism. The proposed target has been set based on those that record a level of 7+ (based on $0=$ no confidence and 10=completely confident)
1.30 How it will be measured/reported: Data will be supplied by PIU based on questions asked in quarterly surveys. It will, therefore, be reported to PMG quarterly. Projects Griffin \& Argus will continue to utilise feedback sheets, although for 2012. The CT section is developing a mechanism to capture levels of satisfaction in relation to engagement with the business community. Currently much of this is not captured and feedback is informal or a personal basis. All performance from the CT section will be submitted to PMG.

## 2 Priority - Economic Crime

## Reason for priority

2.1 The Strategic Assessment states explicitly that the threat to the UK from economic crime is serious and becoming increasingly complex. In 2012 the National Fraud Authority published the annual fraud indicator estimating the cost of fraud to the UK economy to be the region of £73bn. For an environment such as the City of London reputational damage can result in direct financial loss, which impacts on the confidence in the 'UK plc'.
2.2 Fraudsters use increasingly complex methods and the latest, sometimes emerging, technologies to commit their crimes. Unlike other "traditional criminality" therefore, those committing frauds are not limited by physical proximity to their victims. It also means such criminality can be extremely difficult to detect and disrupt.
2.3 Given the amount of money at risk from economic crime it is not surprising that highly organised crime groups play an expanding and diversifying role in economic crime. Technological innovations which seek to improve customers' experience of banking or transacting money provides new opportunities for such groups to exploit weaknesses.
2.4 Protecting the City of London and the UK from the risk posed by economic crime has to be a fundamental priority for the Force. Given the Force's national role in combating fraud, the additional funding it receives for this and the expectations that are an inherent part of that, has to affirm that position.

EC Measure 1 - To increase the number of government and industry sectors providing economic crime data to the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau
2.5 Reason: NFIB's KnowFraud database is already the primary source of intelligence for the UK's National Strategic Assessment. However, there are a number of significant gaps in existing data including insurance and tax fraud. Increasing the pool of
organisations providing crime data to the NFIB will improve the accuracy and validity of strategic products supplied by the NFIB.
2.6 Baseline information: The NFIB currently has 32 data feeds which cover the following 12 sectors:

- Police / law enforcement
- Retail
- Banking (payments)
- Asset Finance
- Company Registration and Regulation
- Land Registry
- NHS
- Postal
- Telecommunications
- Trading Regulators
- Vehicle Trading
- Travel industry
2.7 How it will be measured/reported: This information will be supplied quarterly by the National Fraud Capability Project Team.

EC Measure 2 - To increase quantity and quality of fraud prevention products disseminated by the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau
2.8 Reason: Disrupting fraud enablers is the most cost effective means of reducing the financial harm caused by fraud. Such enablers include bank accounts used to accept stolen money, e-mail addresses used by fraudsters and bogus websites that promote fictitious investment products. Although there is a disparity between the financial values of fraud prevented by disrupting different types of enablers, it is an aspiration of the National Lead Force (NLF) to 'industrialise' the disruption process; more individual activities will correlate with greater amounts of fraud disrupted.

### 2.9 Baseline Information:

## Quantity (Volumetric)

Figure based upon the average volume over the first three quarters - the average has been used as a projected volume for Q4)
Baselines: Number of alerts disseminated in 2012/2013 = 1026.
Number of intelligence disseminations in 2012/2013 = Intelligence Summaries = 756, Initial Profiles = 79, Analytical Products $=43$. TOTAL Intelligence disseminations $=878$ Number of disruption requests 2012/2013 (websites, phones, bank accounts) Websites $=498$, Phones $=329$, Bank Accounts $=394$, TOTAL Tech Disruptions $=1221$ Total = 3125 (to be divided between 12 (calendar months)

Quantitative (survey based)
This will be measured by 'Survey Monkey' responses: increasing the number instances where the alert has a positive action. A positive action is when one or more of the following are selected:

- An alert or warning action is sent out to their customers/stakeholders/community
- Suspension or removal of an account or other exploitable facility
- Enforcement action (Civil or Criminal)
- Change in policy / strategy and in their business

Baseline is $90 \%$ (based on a survey of 32 respondents)
Please note only 6 months data was available so baseline is data $\times 2$.
2.10 How it will be measured/reported: The NFIB will supply this information to the National Fraud Capability Project Team on a monthly basis.

EC Measure 3 - To disrupt the top 10 Fraud organised crime groups causing the greatest harm.
2.11 Reason: Disrupting fraud Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) has the potential to positively impact on the lives of a huge number of potential crime victims (e.g. Boiler Rooms). OCGs also have the greatest financial impact on the UK and rightly deserve prioritising in the enforcement matrix. It is imperative that the disruption of an OCGs capability is correctly assessed, ratified and recorded by the City of London Police. The Organised Crime Group Mapping (OCGM) meeting chaired by the Director of Intelligence will have overview of the OCGs and ensure that Law Enforcement Activity is conducted against those which pose the greatest threat, risk and harm. It will also ensure that ownership of the OCG investigation is allocated to a Lead Responsible Officer (LRO) with an agreed action plan to ensure activity, accountability and disruption opportunities are maximised.
2.12 Baseline Information: City owned OCG data is collected and coordinated by the Force Intelligence Bureau which records all OCG data for the force. This information will be utilised to inform and assist the OCGM. It will also be aggregated into the National picture for OCGs. This process will ensure that activity is directed against the top 10 City owned OCGs and that disruptions are properly assessed, so that results are transparent and ethical. Finally this meeting will document activity against all of the CoLP OCGs along with any disruptions against them, so that a summary of the total disruptions conducted during the year can be documented.
2.13 How it will be measured/reported: A disruption against an OCG will only be recorded where law enforcement activity has disrupted the OCGs capability and will be evidenced by the submission of a disruption document by the LRO to the OCGM. The OCGM panel will assesses the disruption, ratifying that a disruption can be claimed. The OCGM will be conducted on monthly bases to ensure that activity is being conducted against the OCGs, which pose the greatest threat, risk and harm (Top Ten) along with an action plan and LRO being allocated. This process will ensure that FIB will be able to evidence both disruptions against the top 10 City owned OCGs and a summary of all disruptions against the force total OCGs. This will be a monthly report to PMG.

EC Measure 4 - To ensure that at least $90 \%$ of fraud victims are satisfied with the service provided
2.14 Reason: Fraud victims have historically received a poor service from the police - the primary reason for the government's Fraud Review in 2008. The Force has achieved year-on-year improvements in victim satisfaction levels - an ambition of the Lead Force programme is to maintain these levels at or above those for other crime types.
2.15 Baseline Information: The latest survey data demonstrates a satisfaction level of $89 \%$. $90 \%$ has been set to include an element of stretch for the coming year.
2.16 How it will be measured/reported: Data will be collated quarterly by the National Fraud Capability Team who maintain a separate contract with the Force's survey company, SPA Future Thinking. However, for the purposes of efficiency and cost, it is intended these two pieces of work will be merged during 2013/14.

EC Measure 5 - To increase by $10 \%$ the number of police officers, public and private sector investigators trained by the Fraud Academy.
2.17 Reason: High quality investigations improve detection rates and victim satisfaction. This is a core aspiration of National Lead Force - particularly as a good deal of specialist expertise has been lost from the police service over the past decade. Training police, government and private sector investigators to a national standard (Fraud Investigators Handbook) is a key means of achieving this; it also follows the model employed for other specialist areas such as homicide.
2.18 Baseline Information: 531 delegates trained during 2012/13.

How it will be measured/reported: To be reported monthly: Fraud Academy staff will provide their monthly course manifests to the National Fraud Capability Team.

EC Measure 6 - To review fraud investigations to inform Fraud Academy training courses and best practice toolkits.
2.19 Reason: The quality and relevance of fraud training rests on continually refreshing investigators' knowledge of the means by which fraud is committed and any new / more effective ways of evidence gathering. It is therefore critical that training modules delivered by the Fraud Academy exploit the learning and experience of Lead Force investigations.
2.20 Baseline Information: This target does not rely on a baseline being set. Rather, it is concerned with compliance with an absolute standard (a comparison being the

Victims' Charter that compels investigators to update crime victims every calendar month)
2.21 How it will be measured/ reported: The National Fraud Capability Project Team will collect this information on a monthly basis - using the UNIFI system to identify which cases have been 'put away' and therefore require a review to be conducted.

## 3 Priority - Public Order

Reason for priority
3.1 Public order is addressed in detail at two distinct points within the Force's Strategic Assessment (SA): firstly, it is covered in its own right with respect to large scale events ${ }^{3}$; secondly, it is examined in relation to the threat to public order posed by domestic extremism ${ }^{4}$.
3.2 Concerning the first category, the threat posed by a number of groups such Occupy London, Occupy LSX and others is examined in terms of their activities and the continued attractiveness of the City of London as a target for such groups. The SA makes the important point that over the past year the nature of protests taking part in the City of London is growing in scale and in levels of violence. Concerning the second category of domestic extremism; the SA highlights the threat posed by animal rights protesters, environmental and political activists and other single issue groups.
3.3 The SA does not refer to the number of high profile events that take place in the City and which are important from a public order perspective (Lord Mayor's Show, Mansion House/Guildhall event, presence of Royalty and so on) but such events need to be policed sensitively and, like the City environment generally, are attractive targets for protest groups to disrupt and receive extensive media coverage.
3.4 To ensure that the City of London remains a safe and peaceful area, to mitigate the adverse impact of media coverage should an event or protest go awry, and to support effectively the Strategic Policing Requirement, as with economic crime and counter terrorism, there is a strong argument for retaining public order as a key Force priority.

Public Order Measure 1 - Meet all national requirements for public order mobilisation in support of the Strategic Policing Requirement
3.5 Reason: To protect the City effectively the Force requires that a number of suitably trained and equipped officers can be deployed to deal with public order incidents, at a variety of levels: this can range from local specialist support around 'night time economy' venues to large-scale pan-London events. Last year, this target was focussed on supporting the Olympic and Paralympic Games, together with events organised to celebrate the Queen's Diamond Jubilee, none of which will impact on 2013-14. However, the Force's ability to meet national mobilisation requirements is considered an important area, especially in view of the fact the Force must support national mobilisation requirements under the Strategic Policing Requirement. Adopting this measure will ensure that the Force maintains adequate cover in the event it is called upon to provide assistance, and will provide reassurance to the City's community that

[^17]there are sufficient levels of suitable trained/equipped officers to deal with more local incidents.
3.6 Baseline Information: The Force is required to be able to deploy 3 Police Support Units (PSU) under the Strategic Policing Requirement. A PSU consists of 1 Inspector, 3 Sergeants and 21 Constables. The First PSU must be mobilised within 4 hours then a further two PSU's within 24 hours. The 'Learmouth' formula has been looked at nationally, which calculates the number of PSU's required, as a percentage of the force establishment. This would see a reduction to a requirement in requirement down to 2 PSU's if these proposals were accepted. The City of London Police clearly needs to be in a position to be able to release sufficient resources as part of the national mobilisation plan, whilst being in a position to to deal with the threat of harm within our own force boundaries. The Force currently plans for over 1000 events per annum, 40 of which are classified as major or significant, comprising major ceremonial operations, state banquets public protest and crime in action operations. There were 6 mutual aid requests, during the last year including the Olympics and 26 Benbow operations (The Benbow protocol is a formal arrangement between the three principal police forces in London: the MPS CoLP and BTP, to facilitate a coordinated and effective policing response to pre-planned and spontaneous public order events, and to other major events which are cross border or may have an impact on the policing of another force area ).
3.7 The Force currently has 78 level 2 trained Officers and 35 trained to level 1 public order standard, this provides the requisite resources for national mobilisation whilst leaving sufficient assets for a complete PSU to remain in force. In addition the Force currently has six public order Cadre trained command officers who are deployed under the Benbow protocol.
3.8 How it will be measured: Records are maintained by the Force Operational planning team which details each requirement for resources along with our subsequent response. Ongoing training of our level 1 and 2 Officers, along with succession planning responsibility, currently sits with the Chief Inspector Uniformed Policing (Support). Numbers are reviewed quarterly and reported through the public order forum in order that sufficient numbers are retained and trained to the requisite standard.

Public Order Measure 2 - to deliver ongoing organisational improvement and development relating to public order deployments
3.9 Reason: The Force currently enjoys a relatively low number of public complaints against officers (roughly 100 per year). There is, however, a potential vulnerability around civil claims made against the Force, and whilst these are relatively low, the MPS has seen a rising number of litigants appearing post event and protest, who often challenge the interpretation of public order legislation. G20 and the subsequent Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) investigation stands as a reminder of the impact of the application of public order tactics and its perception in the public
domain. As a result there has been a dramatic shift in how the police service views and deals with protest, considering all citizens' rights, particularly under articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Human Rights Act (Freedoms of thought conscience and religion/ freedoms of expression and freedoms of assembly). Our approach to public order policing must be in line with the observations of the IPCC report and the HMIC paper: "Adapting to Protest" The Force already has a strong and effective mechanism for dealing with organisational learning, it is anticipated that the bulk of organisational development and improvement should be delivered under existing governance arrangement.
3.10 Baseline information: There is no existing baseline for this proposed measure.
3.11 How it will be measured/reported: Supplied to PMG monthly will be the number of events and the number of debriefs. The de-briefs should consider as a minimum: the planning and initial resourcing of the event (including the command team); information and intelligence; briefing issues; resource allocation (considering partner agencies and external stakeholders); threat assessment and mitigation of known risks, identification of training issues and resilience. The measure of success with respect to organisational learning will be a consequent reduction in numbers of complaints or actions taken against the police as a result of policing major events.

Public Order Measure 3 - To ensure that at least 85\% of residents and businesses are satisfied with the information received in relation to pre-planned events
3.12 Reason: The proposed measure demonstrates a high level of appropriate engagement with the community to assist dealing with impact of large scale events, including potential disorder.

For the purposes of this measure, an "event" is defined as one where multiple Police Support Units (PSU) ${ }^{5}$ or serials are deployed and a "Bronze Community" is in place with a tactical plan to coordinate engagement with residents and businesses. This measure is carried forward from 2012-13, however, it has been increased from $80 \%$ to 85\%.
3.13 Baseline Information: City of London businesses and residents were surveyed to ascertain the level of satisfaction with Force communications relating to the Queen's Diamond Jubilee (QDJ) arrangements. Marketing company Vocal Ltd of Colchester was commissioned to distribute the surveys and compile the results. Vocal used Survey Monkey and distributed the surveys to CoLP Business and Residents email group addresses on 18th June.

- $\quad 37$ responses were received from residents, with 34 completing the overall satisfaction question.
- 181 responses were received from the business community, with 163 completing the overall satisfaction question.

[^18]- $\quad \mathbf{9 5 . 1 \%}$ (155 out of 163 ) of Business Community respondents answered very satisfied or satisfied to the question: "Overall, how satisfied were you with the information we sent you about the Queen's Diamond Jubilee celebrations?"
- $\quad \mathbf{9 1 . 2 \%}$ (31 out of 34) of Resident respondents answered very satisfied or satisfied to the same question.
3.14 iModus surveyed City of London businesses and residents in respect of the CoLP provision of information in relation to the 2012 Olympic \& Paralympic Games. This survey was conducted during September 2012.
- 100 responses were received from the business community
- $\quad 25$ responses were received from residents.
- $\quad$ Satisfaction levels for business respondents (100 returned) were $96 \%$ which included 54\% very satisfied with the information provided.
- $\quad$ Satisfaction levels for residents (25 returned) were 90\% including 60\% very satisfied.
3.15 Based on levels achieved for 2012-13 the target is increased from $80 \%$ to $85 \%$.
3.16 How it will be measured: Information will be gathered in the same way as currently, by UPD based on survey results from Vocal and iModus and reported to PMG monthly. However, over the coming months that may change due to ongoing work by the Intelligence and Information Directorate concerning community engagement.


## 4 Priority - Crime Reduction

Reason for priority
4.1 Crime reduction has been carried forward from 2012-13. It remains the case that in any survey where people are asked what they expect their local police to do, 'reducing crime' always features near to the top of the responses. Additionally, the Government's sole 'top down' priority to police forces nationally is for them to reduce levels of crime.
4.2 Targeted operations and sustained activity in crime reduction has resulted in consistently reducing crime levels since 2002-3.
4.3 For 2012-13 the Force adopted a more focused approach that concentrated on the following two areas:

- Victim based violent crime, which is an area that impacts on people's sense of security in the City and their confidence in it being a safe place; and
- Victim based acquisitive crime, which includes the Force's highest category of volume crime - theft.
4.4 The term "victim-based" was a new categorisation of crimes that had been agreed by the Home Office and ACPO. The key features of the categorisation are that:
- It distinguishes between four fundamental crime types: violence, stealing, criminal damage and non victim based crimes.
- It avoids perverse incentives by separating victim based crimes from non victim based crimes.
- It attempts, within the constraints of crime categories, to distinguish serious from less serious crimes.
4.5 Victim-based violent crime includes: violence against the person, with and without injury; rape and other sexual offences. It does not include s. 4 and s. 4 (a) Public Order Act offences (causing fear or provocation of violence and causing harassment, alarm or distress respectively, even though both are victim based). Nor does it include robbery (including assault with intent to rob), which are now included in the victim based acquisitive crime category, whereas previously all robbery was counted as violent crime.
4.6 Victim-based acquisitive crime includes: burglary (domestic and non-domestic), robbery (personal and business), vehicle crime (including interference), shoplifting and other categories of theft.
4.7 Having assessed crime performance across other categories of crime, these two areas continue to constitute the largest volume of crimes committed in the City and cover the most serious offences. It is, therefore, proposed to carry forward these targets for 2013-14. The recent trends in violent crime demonstrate that it will continue to be a challenge to achieve a straightforward reduction, as with acquisitive crime.

Crime Reduction Measure 1 - To reduce levels of victim-based violent crime ${ }^{6}$ compared to 2012-13
4.8 Reason: This is an area of criminality that impacts on feeling of safety of communities and confidence in the City of London as safe place. Reducing crime across the range of crimes that constitutes this category will support the national requirement to reduce crime levels. (See Appendix A for categories of crimes covered).

### 4.9 Baseline information

April - November 2012: 402 offences recorded (April - November 2011: 368)
4.10 At the end of November 2012 the Force was 23 incidents above target. This is compared to +4 in October, +1 in September and -1 in August highlighting that achievement of the target is becoming more challenging. 63 crimes were recorded in November, the highest month of the year so far and any month in 2011/12.
4.11 Last year, December, February and March saw relatively high levels of violent crime recorded which could provide an opportunity for some reduction over the next four months. However, for the last two years the average of these months has been higher than the yearly average; if this is a seasonal trend it may not be possible to achieve sufficient reduction to meet the target.


[^19]
4.12 Trends based on between 6 months and 2 years data indicate that the Force will end the year above target at between 619 and 642 offences. A straightforward reduction on these figures remains a challenging target.
4.13 How will it be measured and reported: The data for crime statistics is well developed and in use. PIU will supply information monthly to PMG that will show current performance and year to date performance.

Crime Reduction Measure $\mathbf{2}$ - To reduce levels of victim-based acquisitive crime ${ }^{7}$ compared to 2012-13
4.14 Reason: The crimes that constitute this category represent the greatest volume of crimes recorded by the Force. As with victim-based violent crime, a reduction in these crimes will support the government's directive to reduce crime levels. Fewer resources mean that a straightforward reduction on 2012-13 levels remains challenging.

[^20]Crime categories included in this target and approximate numerical weighting:

| Victim Based Acquisitive Crime | Offences Apr- <br> Sep 2012 <br> Based <br> Acquisitive <br> Crime |  |
| :--- | ---: | :--- |
| Other Theft | 922 | $48.2 \%$ |
| Theft from Shops | 294 | $15.4 \%$ |
| Non domestic burglary | 196 | $10.3 \%$ |
| Theft of pedal cycle | 187 | $9.8 \%$ |
| Theft from the person | 158 | $8.3 \%$ |
| Theft from a vehicle | 63 | $3.3 \%$ |
| Theft of Motor Vehicle, inc. Agg Taking and <br> Vehicle Interference (but not unauthorised <br> driving of a vehicle from stolen outside CoL) | 31 | $1.6 \%$ |
| Robbery | 19 | 13 |
| Theft by employee | 13 | $0.0 \%$ |
| Domestic burglary | 8 | $0.4 \%$ |
| Preserved other fraud | 8 | $0.4 \%$ |
| Theft in dwelling | 4 | $0.2 \%$ |
| Blackmail | 4 | $0.2 \%$ |
| Theft from meter/machine | 3 | $0.2 \%$ |
| Theft of mail | 19 | $0.1 \%$ |
| Dishonest use of electricity | $0.0 \%$ |  |
|  | $100 \%$ |  |

Baseline Information: April - November 2012: 2,533 offences recorded (April - November 2011: 2,781). At the end of November 2012 the Force has an 8.9\% (-248) reduction in victim based acquisitive crime and is $6.2 \%$ ( -167 ) below target. It is anticipated that the target will be met, with an end of year between a 6 and $10 \%$ reduction. The Force continues to see large reductions in shoplifting (-96), theft of pedal cycle (-120) and theft other (-36). Theft of vehicles has also fallen by 27 crimes.

Total Victim Based Acquisitive Crime


### 4.17

312 crimes were recorded in November which is slightly higher than the same month last year (+6). An average of 379 crimes can be recorded per month to achieve an end of year crime reduction. This figure has not been exceeded in any month of the year so far. Acquisitive crime has been relatively low during the December and January for the past two years, so crime reduction during these months may be rather more challenging. However, this will not impact on overall achievement of the target.
4.18 How will it be measured and reported: The data for crime statistics is well developed and in use. PIU will supply information monthly to PMG that will show current performance and year to date performance.

## 5 Priority - Roads Policing

Reason for priority
5.1 Roads policing and road safety remains a recurring priority for residents and visitors to the City of London, as well as our partners in the City of London Corporation and Transport for London. Its inclusion as a Force priority supports those partnership obligations in addition to ACPO and Department for Transport national road policing and safety strategies. Very recently the issue has also taken on a national dimension, attracting much media attention. The number of people injured on roads in the City is significant, and whilst there are limits to what the Force can actually do to impact on those levels, it is right that roads policing remains a Force priority.

Roads Policing Measure 1 - To support the City of London Corporation's casualty reduction target through enforcement and education activities
5.2 Reason: The Force's target in this area has traditionally been set around the number of Killed/Seriously Injured (KSI) people on the City's roads. Levels of KSIs are relatively low and too low to indicate any meaningful trend analysis. There are no seasonal trends relating to people killed or seriously injured or for total collisions. The matter has been the subject of problem profiles and reports to SMB and PMG.
5.3 It is accepted that the Force can impact on the overall volume of collisions through a combination of education, enforcement and engineering. The Force has no control over what sort of injury might result from a collision, or its severity. It was for that principal reason that the target was amended last year from a KSI target to a collision reduction target. However, whilst the Force's activities can impact on levels of collisions, to quantify that as a numerical target remains notoriously difficult. It is widely accepted that the responsibility to reduce the number of KSIs rests with the local authority and the most effective mechanism to deal with the issue is as a joint approach with partners. For that reason, the target proposed for 2013-14 is not a quantitive target but a 'narrative' target around supporting the City of London Corporation's KSI and all casualty reduction targets. This will be underpinned by one or two tactical measures focussing on enforcement and education activities.
5.4 Baseline Information: KSI TARGET = The Corporation's KSI target is based on the following baseline: 247 people killed or seriously injured in the City in road traffic collisions between 2004 and 2008 (inclusive), an annual average of 49.4. The City Corporation's target is to reduce the number of persons killed or seriously injured in road traffic collisions to a three-year rolling average of 39.1 casualties per annum by 2013, representing a reduction of $20.9 \%$ from the 2004-2008 average of 49.4 casualties per annum.
5.5 The City Corporation's longer-term target is to reduce the number of persons killed or seriously injured in road traffic collisions to $50 \%$ below the 2004-2008 average by 2020, i.e., to a three-year rolling average of 24.7 casualties per annum by 2020
5.6 ALL CASUALTY TARGET = There were 1,843 people injured in the City in road traffic collisions between 2004 and 2008 (inclusive), an annual average of 368.6. The City Corporation's target is to reduce the total number of persons injured in road traffic collisions to a three-year rolling average of 322.5 casualties per annum by 2013. This represents a reduction of $12.5 \%$ from the 2004-2008 average of 368.6 casualties per annum.
5.7 The City Corporation's longer-term target is to reduce the total number of persons injured in road traffic collisions to $30 \%$ below the 2004-2008 average by 2020, i.e., to a three-year rolling average of 258.0 casualties per annum by 2020.
5.8 How it will be measured/reported: The reporting against how the Force is achieving this target will consist of details of activities the Force has completed in support of the target (e.g. specific operations, recent ones have included Op Atrium, Op Giant (uninsured drivers), and an operation focussing on enforcement of dangerous loads legislation). This will be supported by quantitive tactical targets as below.

Roads policing Measure 2- To increase the number of uninsured vehicles seized and unlicensed drivers apprehended compared to 2012-13
5.9 Reason: By targeting uninsured and unlicensed vehicles and impounding them, the Force is reducing the potential risk of those vehicles being involved in incidents. It could also act as a deterrent to uninsured drivers travelling to or through the City of London. Those road users that are prepared to flout these laws are likely to engage in other criminality, and by targeting them the Force has an opportunity to make an impact on crime in general.

### 5.10 Baseline Information:

| Seizures | $2011-12$ (pro <br> rata) | $2012-13$ to <br> date | $2012-13$ <br> projected |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| No Insurance | $253(169)$ | 169 | 289 |
| No D/L | $125(82)$ | 69 | 118 |
| Both | $80(59)$ | 61 | 104 |
| Total | $458(310)$ | 299 | 511 |

5.11 The projection is calculated on the monthly average for the previous seven months being the number seized each month for the next 5 months. (The last 5 months of last year had a total of 148 whereas the projection for the next 5 months is 212 - the average is 42 ). We should increase the number by $5 \%$ for next year over the final figure for this year and include driving licence seizures as well.
5.12 How it will be measured: Data will be supplied to PMG monthly by UPD, reporting levels against a year to date target.

Roads Policing Measure 3: To increase the number of referrals to the Cycle Safe Scheme ${ }^{8}$ and the Driver Alert Scheme compared to 2012-13
5.13 Reason: These initiatives both support the casualty reduction target and directs attention at irresponsible road use by cyclists, which continues to be a perennial issue raised by members of the public in consultation exercises, and drivers. They also support ACPO's and the Department of Transport's Strategy for Roads Policing, which seeks to divert those involved in poor road use away from prosecution and offers a longer term solution by improving behaviour of cyclists and drivers on the roads.
5.14 BASELINE INFORMATION (Cycle Safe)

2011-12 Baseline $=128$
Monthly profile $=74$
Actual $=119$

[^21]| Month | Tickets <br> issued <br> $2011 / 2012$ | Course <br> Completed <br> $2011 / 2012$ | $\%$ <br> completed <br> $2011 / 2012$ | Profile | Tickets <br> issued <br> $2012 / 2013$ | Total | Total <br> Courses <br> Completed <br> $2012 / 2013$ | \% <br> completed <br> 2012/2013 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Apr | 16 | 13 | $81 \%$ | 10.5 | 3 | 3 |  |  |
| May | 16 | 12 | $75 \%$ | 21 | 33 | 36 |  |  |
| Jun | 9 | 2 | $22 \%$ | 32 | 5 | 41 |  |  |
| Jul | 6 | 5 | $83 \%$ | 42 | 8 | 53 |  |  |
| Aug | 5 | 3 | $60 \%$ | 53 | 34 | 86 |  |  |
| Sep | 19 | 14 | $74 \%$ | 63 | 14 | 100 |  |  |
| Oct | 9 | 2 | $22 \%$ | 74 | 24 | 124 | 85 | $69 \%$ |
| Nov | 19 | 9 | $47 \%$ | 84 | 5 | 129 | 90 | $70 \%$ |
| Dec | 11 | 3 | $27 \%$ | 95 |  |  |  |  |
| Jan | 4 | 1 | $25 \%$ | 106 |  |  |  |  |
| Feb | 6 | 2 | $33 \%$ | 117 |  |  |  |  |
| Mar | 8 | 8 | $100 \%$ | 128 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 128 | 74 | $58 \%$ | 128 |  |  |  |  |

5.15 Current performance is running significantly above profile. A straightforward increase in the in the total (when known for the end of the year) will be a challenging target given the Force restructuring and the reduction in levels of resources.
5.16 Baseline Information (Driver Alert) The current number of drivers that have been referred to the scheme from May 2011 to September 2012 is 40 . The end of year baseline will not be known until the end of the financial year
5.17 How it will be measured: Information will be supplied by UPD monthly to PMG in the format above but incorporating Driver Alert Referrals.

## Reason for priority

6.1 The Force's Strategic Assessment highlights antisocial behaviour (particularly that associated with the night time economy) as a significant issue. It remains an issue that is high on the government's agenda, and is a recurring theme in surveys and community engagement events. It also remains a priority for the Safer City Partnership. Antisocial behaviour has been adopted by the Force as a discrete priority for the first time for 2013-14.

ASB measure 1 - To ensure that at least $90 \%$ or more crime victims and those reporting antisocial behaviour are satisfied with the way police handled their case.
6.2 Reason: Satisfaction with the Force of how it handles the cases of victims of crime and antisocial behaviour is an important indication of the quality and professionalism of the service provided. Comments made as part of the surveys provides the Force with invaluable information about how service delivery can be improved.
6.3 Baseline Information: The 2012-13 Policing Plan target of $85 \%$ was based on all the overall satisfaction of all victims/witnesses of ASB that were surveyed. At the end of 2011/12 the satisfaction level was 92.3\% (220 respondents). So far this year (Apr Sep) the satisfaction level is $93.2 \%$ ( 90 respondents). It is proposed, therefore, to increase the target to $90 \%$ for 2013-14.


Since July 2011 quarterly satisfaction levels have consistently been above 90\%.

A relatively low number of people are surveyed on a 12 month period (192) and only a few of these individuals express dissatisfaction (13).

This target is easily being met by CoLP.
6.4 How it will be measured/reported: Data will be supplied by PIU quarterly following surveys having been conducted.

ASB measure 2 - To reduce the average annual number of rough sleepers in the City of London
6.5 Reason: This supports the City of London Corporation's target to reduce the level ultimately to zero. It also supports Safer City Partnership targets in this area.
6.6 Baseline Information: 2011-12

| Area | Feb <br> 11 | Mar <br> 11 | Apr <br> 11 | May <br> 11 | Jul <br> 11 | Aug <br> 11 | Sep <br> 11 | Oct <br> 11 | Nov <br> 11 | Dec <br> 11 | Jan <br> 12 | Mar <br> 12 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Fleet Street | 5 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 |
| Barts | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 5 |
| St. Paul's | 5 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 3 |
| Barbican | 3 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 9 | 6 | 2 | 6 | 6 |
| Liverp'l St | 0 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Aldgate | 7 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 9 |
| Cannon St | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 11 |
| Tower Hill | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 4 |
| Total | 23 | 19 | 19 | 22 | 22 | 20 | 25 | 26 | 19 | 19 | 25 | 39 |

Apr 2012 to date

| Area | Apr <br> 12 | May <br> 12 | Jun <br> 12 | Jul <br> 12 | Aug <br> 12 | Sep <br> 12 | Oct <br> 12 | Nov <br> 12 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Fleet Street | 3 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 5 |
| Barts | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| St. Paul's | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 6 | 1 | 3 | 5 |
| Barbican | 6 | 3 | 3 | 8 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 2 |
| Liverp'l St | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| Aldgate | 4 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Cannon St | 9 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 6 | 4 |
| Tower Hill | 4 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 0 |
| Total | 36 | 23 | 19 | 22 | 15 | 15 | 19 | 21 |

6.7 The "spike" in numbers of rough sleepers recorded for March and April 2012 was due to Op Poncho (the operation that works to reduce numbers of rough sleepers) being withdrawn. This is evidence that the Force can impact on levels of rough sleepers, however, it is also clear that even with the operation running, there is a fairly constant number of people sleeping rough in the City that ranges from between 15 and 25 . The proposal is to reduce the number of people sleeping rough in the City based on a baseline of 20 , being the average number of the past 20 months disregarding the two abnormally high months..
6.8 How it will be measured/reported: Data will be supplied by UPD monthly to PMG against a profiled target.

ASB measure 3 - To actively promote, with partners, effective stewardship and crime prevention activities within licensed premises
6.9 Reason: Anti Social behaviour associated with the NTE can have a disastrous effect on surrounding communities and the infrastructure that supports them. Local residents who are victims of crime (both actual and potential) incur costs both in anticipation (e.g alarm systems/ security measures) and as a consequence (property damaged/stolen/noise pollution/personal injury etc ) the fear of crime can reduce peoples quality of life and enjoyment. There are extra costs associated with healthcare, criminal justice system, policing, street cleansing, environmental health, fire etc. This will be amplified over the coming months as Uniformed Policing notices a drop in available resources to be able to deal with the cycle of responding and enforcing action; hence it is important that the Police engages positively alongside the local authority and partners with the licensees in order to mitigate risks and recommend measures as appropriate to prevent offending within licensed premises.
6.10 Baseline Information: Three simplified categories (Personal, Nuisance, and Environmental) were introduced in April 2012, reducing the number of categories from the original 14 . This was intended to change the emphasis from merely recording and responding to incidents to identifying those vulnerable individuals, communities and environments most at risk and responding appropriately.

The three categories are explained as follows:

## Personal

Incidents that are deliberately targeted, or aimed at having an impact, on a particular individual or specific group - rather than the community at large. This would include incidents such as begging or trespass.

## Nuisance

Incidents where an individual or group causes trouble, annoyance, inconvenience, offence or suffering to people in the local community in general, rather than being
deliberately targeted at specific individuals or groups; Rowdy and inconsiderate behaviour are categorised under Nuisance.

## Environmental

This category deals with the interface between people and places. It includes incidents and inconsiderate actions which have an impact on the surroundings including natural, built and social environments. Fly tipping, graffiti or noise would be categorised under environmental.

In the previous year (Nov 11 to Oct 12) incidents were categorised as follows:

- ASB - Environmental - 86
- ASB - Nuisance - 1339
- ASB - Personal - 192
- 

This would indicate that in the City of London the most prominent type of ASB is not directed at individual persons, but is instead behaviours which cause a more general annoyance to the whole community.

Rowdy / Inconsiderate Behaviour continues to be the most prevalent type of ASB in the City and accounts for $\mathbf{6 4 \%}$ of all ASB incidents.
6.11 How it will be measured/reported: There were 11 prosecutions last year by the licensing authority for a number of wide ranging infringements. It not proposed that this figure alone be representative of success in this area as we are looking to achieve a reduction in overall offending and prevention of anti social and criminal behaviour, but it will be important to monitor the level of enforcement activity, and its effect on preventing both crime and antisocial behaviour, along with any predicted displacement to other venues. Licensing visits are already a regular feature of targeted police activity along with partnership operations driven through the licensing tactical group, chaired by the Supt Community Engagement and working with the Director of Public protection The City of London Police to continue to work alongside the Safer City Partnership , Licensing authority, Broadway, Parking Services, Housing Services, Environmental Health and other Corporation Departments to ensure that ASB in the City is effectively managed and prevented in the future. These joint operations are resource intensive and challenging to coordinate, however 3 to 5 joint agency operations being run throughout the year is a realistic target. Additionally Regular licensed premises visits number on average approximately 20 per week.

All licensing activity is monitored at the fortnightly partnership licensing tactical group and subsequently reported to PMG.

Additional preventative measures will also include:

Fixed penalty tickets for urination in public places, covered under section 87 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990; this is new and fairly groundbreaking. Numbers will be collated and reported to PMG.

ASB measure 4 - To run intelligence led operations to target threats associated with the night time economy.
6.12 Reason: Licensed premises in the City of London have a host of associated crime and ASB issues, often caused by individuals who are known to the criminal justice system Gangs are a significant driver for a range of criminal activity, ranging from drug supply, knife crime, serious violence through to firearms offences and murder. In addition to the serious criminality posed by organised gangs in London, the emergence of violent youth gangs also poses specific challenges around serious youth violence, street robberies and anti-social behaviour. In most of the cases intelligence reports regarding persons involved with London Street Gangs (LSG) and firearms criminality revolve around promoted music events held in the City
6.13 Baseline Information: Analysis of violent crime trends over the past 3 years has found that serious violent offences have increased, and in particular the instance of these in the early hours of Sunday morning. This rise in offences, and their location correlates with the rise in Promoted Events being held in the City. Promoted events are most often held on a Saturday night, with closing times peaking at 04:00 on Sunday. It has been suggested that the City is experiencing a displacement of gang related promoted events as a result of proactive work targeting clubs within the MPS. This could increase the risk of gang related violence in the City.

The numbers of offences that occur within licences premises, generally public houses and night clubs during NTE hours is $10 \%$ of all offences in licensed premises. The number of offences that occur during the hours of the NTE. is 243 offences out of 402 offences, or $60.4 \%$. (third quartile figures).
6.14 How it will be measured/reported: FIB will continue to engage with partner law enforcement agencies to ensure that we are in possession of all relevant material held on databases in relation to current gangs and their members which present the greatest risk of harm to the City of London, our clubs and its patrons.

Target offenders by maximising use of tactics such as CCTV and ANPR to identify and predict violent activity at an early stage. We will run regular pre planned pro-active ANPR triggered operations to identify the vehicles of known individuals that Intelligence suggests are involved in criminality including drugs supply and violence. Our assets will be used in order to stop these vehicles where appropriate and take appropriate positive action, disrupting and preventing criminality.

We will continue to implement high visibility patrols during peak hours of the NTE in identified hotspot areas and direct policing activity against identified emerging trends.

Ensure Cross Directorate Violent Crime Reduction Plan is implemented via Force Tasking processes and Daily Management Meeting in order to identify strong enforcement and prevention opportunities.

Undertake regular, high profile licensing visits to premises where violent crimes have occurred.

Engage with partners, such as the Safer City Partnership (Safety Thirst Programme) and Night Time Economy Group, to develop tactical solutions to reduce criminal opportunities.

Implement intervention measures relating to promoted events in the force, particularly in cases where there is intelligence to suggest an elevated risk of harm, or where there is a previous history of violence or disorder. It will be reported to PMG monthly.

## 7. OTHER MEASURES

## Satisfaction measure - To ensure that at least $85 \%$ of the City's street population surveyed consider the police in the City of London are doing a good or excellent job

7.1 Reason: Unlike the previous measure, this survey indicates levels of confidence amongst the general street population, not just those who have been a victim of crime or antisocial behaviour. However, as the previous measure, it is an invaluable indication of the level of professionalism the Force portrays and provides.
7.2 Baseline Information: Victims of Crime - All Victims - The current Policing Plan target of $85 \%$ was based on all the overall satisfaction of all victims of crime that were surveyed. At the end of 2011/12 the satisfaction level was $88.0 \%$ ( 913 respondents). So far this year (Apr - Sep) the satisfaction level is $87.6 \%$ ( 348 respondents). (See next page). However, at the workshop on the $18^{\text {th }}$ January Members elected to keep the target as $85 \%$ for $2013 / 14$.

7.3 On a quarterly basis, satisfaction levels tend to be between 85-90\%. These levels need to remain constant if the satisfaction level seen in 2011/12 is to be matched. CoLP are on track to meet the $85 \%$ target. The 12 rolling month satisfaction figures have dropped from those seen 2 year ago. Areas of lower satisfaction are often that victims are not satisfied with the course of action taken or being kept informed.
7.4 Victims of Crime - ADR Categories - the Home Office collates and publishes the satisfaction levels of victims of Violence, Domestic Burglary and Vehicle Crime. CoLP's crime figures for these categories are low and therefore percentages can be disproportionately affected. At the end of 2011/12 the satisfaction level was $85.3 \%$ (174 respondents). So far this year (Apr - Sep) the satisfaction level is 75.0\% (75 respondents). In the last 12 rolling month period there have been 137 respondents. Of these 3 were victims of Domestic Burglary, 86 of violence and 48 of vehicle crime.

7.5 The 12 rolling month figure has dropped due to lower satisfaction levels between Oct 11 - Mar 12. The higher levels seen at the beginning of 2011 are also no longer included in the 12 month total. This is due to lower levels of satisfaction for victims of vehicle crime. However these levels have increased over the past two quarters. If satisfaction levels continue at the same level seen in the previous two quarters the 12 rolling month total will have increase by the end of the March 2013.
7.6 How it will be measured / reported: Information will be supplied quarterly by PIU to PMG following completion of street surveys.

Response measure 1: To respond to at least 95\% of 999 calls within the national response target of 12 minutes
7.7 Reason: It is important that when someone calls for emergency assistance the response is swift and professional. This target provides an opportunity to boost public confidence by highlighting how quickly calls for service are attended. With reductions to the levels of resources being implemented over the course of the policing plan, it is not proposed to increase this target.
7.8 Baseline Information: 1190 out of 1221 (97.5\%) of incidents in the City that were graded for immediate response were attended within 12 minutes. The response rate for November was $97.2 \%$ ( 140 out of 144 incidents). Over the last 12 months the Force has consistently achieved this target.

Percentage of immediate response calls attended within 12 mins

7.9 How it will be measured/reported: data will be supplied by PIU to PMG monthly in the format above

APPENDIX A
VICTIM BASED VIOLENCE and VICTIM BASED ACQUISITIVE CRIMES

|  | Violence with injury | Murder |  | Rape |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Attempted Murder | ual Offences | Indecent / Sexual assault |
|  |  | Causing death by dangerous driving |  | Sexual activity involving a child |
|  |  | Actual Bodily Harm and other Injury |  | Exposure and Voyeurism |
|  |  |  |  | Robbery of personal property |
|  |  | Racially/Religiously Aggravated Actual Bodily Harm | Robbery | Robbery of business property |
|  |  | Wounding | Burglary Dwelling | Burglary in a dwelling |
|  |  | Manslaughter | Burglary NonDwelling | Burglary in a building other than a dwelling |
|  |  | Assault with injury | Vehicle Crime | Aggravated vehicle taking |
|  |  | Inflicting Grievous Bodily Harm without Intent |  | Theft or unauthorised taking of vehicle |
| O |  | Racially or Religiously Agg Assault with Injury |  | Theft from a vehicle |
|  | Violence without injury | Harassment |  | Interfering with a Motor Vehicle |
|  |  | Racially or Religiously Aggravated Harassment | Shoplifting | Shoplifting |
| $\infty$ |  | Threats to Kill | Other Acquisitive Crime | Theft from the person |
|  |  | Kidnapping |  | Theft in a dwelling |
|  |  | Child Cruelty |  | Theft or unauthorised taking of a cycle |
|  |  | Child abduction |  | Other theft |
|  |  | Assault without Injury |  | Blackmail |
|  |  | Racially/Religiously Agg Assault without Injury |  | Theft by an employee |
|  |  | Assault without Injury on a Constable |  | Theft of mail |
|  |  | Endangering Life |  | Theft from automatic machine or meter |
|  |  |  |  | Fraud other than Cheque and Credit card |

VICTIM BASED CRIMES NOT INCLUDED IN POLICING PLAN TARGETS


VICTIM OR STATUTE (GROUPING MAY CHANGE FOR NFIB)

| Excluded Fraud | Frauds by company directors etc. |
| :---: | :---: |
|  | Fraudulent Trading by Sole Trader |
|  | False accounting |
|  | Fraud by False Representation - cheque, plastic card and online accounts |
|  | Fraud by False Representation - Other Fraud |
|  | Fraud by Failing to Disclose Information |
|  | Fraud by Abuse of Position |
|  | Other forgery |
|  | Cheque and Credit card fraud |
|  | Obtaining Services Dishonestly |
|  | Forgery or use of false drug prescription |

This page is intentionally left blank


[^0]:    The bulk of forces fall into defined clusters to form a Group, but there are a few who are less closely clustered. These are the Metropolitan Police, Dyfed-
    Powys, Surrey and the City of London. These forces are still included within a most similar group, but their appearance as an outlier needs to be treated with more caution.

[^1]:    The profiles are presented in the form of logic trees with the data broken down progressively from left to right. By following the branches of the logic tree, you can identify the reason(s) for difference between your force and the others. For example, is this force spending more on police officers because there are more of them (officers per population) or because they are more expensive (cost per officer).

[^2]:    While we are aware of these issues, we are not yet convinced of the need to remove the relevant pages. Instead we have included an additional summary expenditure page by function, opposite the summary staffing page. Comparison of the net cost or staffing numbers by function, makes it clear which forces are involved in collaboration with other forces and which with the private sector. The non staff costs page is also retained because it so clearly identifies forces currently Lincolnshire and Cleveland - who have undertaken large scale initiatives.

    To help further with comparisons, an appendix includes a list of forces that have contracted out some or most of their custody function as well as those involved in Private Finance Initiatives (PFI). This provides some context, especially when comparing premises costs where a PFI scheme is involved. Earned income vs. government grant Another concern, identified by North Wales Police, concerns the recording of Criminal Record Bureau (CRB) funding. Most forces have coded CRB funding as earned income while others have coded it as a grant. The POA guidance clearly states that CRB income be coded to grants. The relevant forces have been contacted and asked to submit corrections which are included.

    Use of budgeted and actual staff numbers The profiles include staff numbers drawn from two data sets: the Home Office annual data return (ADR 502) which is a snapshot on 31st March of full time equivalent staff in post and the police objective analysis which counts the average, budgeted, full time

[^3]:    These chation.
    These charts give an overview of what policing in each force costs
    per head of population.

[^4]:    Band D tax rate $\begin{array}{lrrr} & £ 0 & £ 0 & \text { na }\end{array}$
    Average

[^5]:    These charts show the overall police workforce per 1,000
    population which are then broken down into police officers, police
    staff and PCSOs.
    We have subdivided officers into community police officers (CPO

    - those within neighbourhood response, traffic roles and
    probationers) and others, and therefore used ADR 502 and 601
    as the data source.

[^6]:    Two further charts show numbers of constables (and PCSOs) per sergeant giving an indication of the supervision requirement for each sergeant.

[^7]:    Source: ADR521 \& ADR 502 (as at 31/03/12 and 30/09/2011)

[^8]:    These charts show sickness absence broken down into short and medium term (28 days and less) and long term (more than 28 days).

    Officers on restricted duties (i.e. officers who, because of a disability or other limiting factor, are unable to undertake the full range of operational duties) and recuperative duties (officers returning to work in a phased way after injury or illness) are included separately.

    NB: The gaps towards the left of some charts indicate that data is not available or has not been included; absence above $12 \%$ of the workforce and zero absence have been excluded.

[^9]:    CRIMINAL JUSTICE ARRANGEMENTS
    Objectives - cost per head of population

[^10]:    Crimes stated are those recorded on
    Crimesec3
    shown per 100 charges.
    Crimes stated are those
    These charts show the NRE cost of criminal justice (as opposed to criminal justice

    FTE within the criminal justice function is then

[^11]:    Cost／fte $\quad$ All MSG

    | Police officers | $£ 60 \mathrm{k}$ | $£ 53 \mathrm{k}$ | $£ 60 \mathrm{k}$ |
    | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

    Source：POA estimates 2012／13

[^12]:    Source. POA estimates 2012/13

[^13]:    Source: Home Office Crime Statistics 2011/12

[^14]:    |  | \% | MSG |
    | :--- | :--- | ---: |
    | Charge summons | $58 \%$ | $58 \%$ | | Charge summons | $58 \%$ | $58 \%$ |
    | :--- | :--- | :--- |
    | Cautions | $22 \%$ | $22 \%$ | Cautions $\begin{array}{lrr}\text { Penalty notices } & 2 \% & 2 \% \\ & 16 \% & 16 \%\end{array}$ Cannabis warnings Taken into consideration | Taken into consideration | $1 \%$ | $1 \%$ |
    | ---: | ---: | ---: |
    | Total | $100 \%$ | $100 \%$ | Source: Home Office Crime Statistics 2011/12

[^15]:    These charts show how the proportions of the types of sanction detections have changed
    since 2008/09. Note that up to 2008/09
    cannabis warnings were recorded as FPN
    detections, from this point they have moved
    detections,
    into 'Other'.

[^16]:    ${ }^{1}$ Project Griffin is an internationally renowned partnership project that brings together the Police and private security guards to provide awareness and protective security to prevent and prepare for the consequences of terrorist incidents. It is widely accepted as good practice and has recently been adopted nationally by the National Counter Terrorism and Security Office (NaCTSO). It is a key tactic in the Force's objective of keeping the City safe from terrorism
    ${ }^{2}$ Project Argus (Area Reinforcement Gained Using Scenarios) is a NaCTSO initiative which aims to help businesses to prevent, prepare for, handle and recover from a terrorist attack.

[^17]:    ${ }^{3}$ Strategic Assessment 7.9 pg 38
    ${ }^{4}$ Strategic Assessment 8.1.7 et seq. pg 47

[^18]:    ${ }^{5}$ A PSU consists of 1 inspector, 3 sergeants and 21 constables ( 6 per sergeant +1 driver)

[^19]:    ${ }^{6}$ This relates to "victim based violent crime", a distinct crime categorisation that incorporates violence against the person, with and without injury; rape and other sexual offences.

[^20]:    ${ }^{7}$ This relates to victim based acquisitive crime

[^21]:    ${ }^{8}$ The Capital Cycle Safe Scheme is an initiative that provides cyclists who have been apprehended for poor road use with an opportunity to be diverted from prosecution on to an education scheme rather than face prosecution or a $£ 30$ fixed penalty notice fine. This option is only available once in a three year period. If the course is not completed, the individual is issued with a summons for the original offence.

